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THE SYSTEMS APPROACH TO
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION
INTRODUCTION
The observation that the criminal courts of this country are seri-
ously backlogged has been so extensively documented that it has be-
come hackneyed. In many of our urban criminal courts assembly-line
justice has long been the norm.' As the volume of criminal cases con-
tinues to grow, these cases are hurried through crowded courts in order
to avoid even greater congestion and delay.2 The pressure to dispose of
criminal cases has created situations where the criminal justice process
has been debased, where, as one observer has remarked, the "lower
criminal courts tend to be operated more like turnstiles than tri-
bunals."S
The natural tension that exists throughout the criminal justice
process between efficiency (protecting the community from crime) and
fairness (protecting the rights of the individual accused of crime)4 has
1. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 318 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY].
2. The problem of court congestion is a problem of "system" delay. Even though all
parties in a case are prepared and eager to proceed, the courts are unable to accommo-
date them promptly because numerous other controversies are scheduled ahead of them.
The kind of delay which lawyers create through their own unreadiness or unwillingness
to proceed is discussed below at note 139 infra & accompanying text.
3. Freed, The Nonsystem of Criminal Justice, in LAW AND ORDER RECONSIDERED,
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW AND LAW ENFORCEMENT TO THE NATIONAL COM-
MISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE 263, 266 (J. Campbell, J.
Sabid & D. Stang eds. 1970) [hereinafter cited as LAW AND ORDER RECONSIDERED].
4. See CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY at 374. Professor Herbert Packer
has provided an excellent discussion of the competing values which underlie criminal
justice processes. Professor Packer posits two models of the criminal process: the Crime
Control Model and the Due Process Model. The Crime Control Model
requires that primary attention be paid to the efficiency with which the crim-
inal process operates to screen suspects, determine guilt, and secure appropriate
dispositions of persons convicted of crime.
. . . The Model that will operate successfully on these presuppositions
must be an administrative, almost a managerial, model. . . . The criminal
process, in this model, is seen as a screening process in which each successive
stage . . . involves a series of routinized operations whose success is gauged
primarily by their tendency to pass the case along to a successful conclusion.
H. PACKER, THE LiMIrrS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 158-60 (1968) [hereinafter cited
-as LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION].
The Due Process Model focuses on the demand for reliability in criminal adjudica-
tions. This model requires that there be established in each case a high degree of proba-
.bility that factual guilt has been accurately determined. To avoid human error (and
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been increased by court decisions requiring the intervention of de-
fense counsel at earlier stages of the adjudicative process.r While
efforts are being made in one direction to push a growing volume of
cases through the courts, many of these decisions require that greater
attention and deliberation be accorded each case. In light of such de-
cisions and the increasing backlogs, some have seen a need to make the
process more efficient so that the judicial institutions do not simply
grind to a halt.6 Others have observed that, despite judicial mandates,
the crush of cases prevents the individual defendant from receiving ade-
quate consideration by the courts:
The process is depersonalized and dehumanized. It offends against the
basic precept that justice should not be rationed. For many people
this assembly-line process is their only contact with the criminal law.
It is hardly one that conduces to respect, either for the process or for
the norms that the process seeks to enforce. The rationale of the crim-
inal sanction demands that a judgment of conviction be both weighty
and considered. With assembly-line crimes it is neither.7
Despite the general aversion to the administration of justice "with
one eye on the clock and the other on the checkbook,"8 it is the prevail-
ing administrative reality. Justice in the United States is rationed be-
cause of limited adjudicative resources and the inefficient utilization of
these resources.9 The rationing of justice has made the application of
modem management technology, automated information systems and
related computer techniques to criminal justice processes highly attrac-
tive.10 Lured by exotic computer hardware and the prospect of impos-
thus to assure that the factually innocent are adequately protected) this model would
require that all facets of a case be carefully scrutinized. This model vould extend the
scrutiny of the case "at least as long as there is an allegation of factual error that has
not received an adjudicative hearing in a fact-finding context." Professor Packer likens
the Due Process Model to "a factory that has to devote a substantial part of its input
to quality control. This necessarily cuts down on quantitative output." Id. at 164-65.
5. See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964).
6. CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIETY at 375.
7. LImITs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION at 292.
8. THE INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSIS, TASK FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 37 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TAsK FORCE REPORT:
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY].
9. Id.
10. For discussions of economic approaches to criminal justice administration,
suggesting that an important purpose of procedural rules and practices is to achieve
efficiency in resource allocation, see Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure
and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 399 (1973); Landes, The Bail System:
An Economic Approach, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 79 (1973); Landes, An Economic Anal-
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ing order in an area characterized by chaotic mismanagement, criminal
justice administrators have widely implemented these management sci-
ence techniques.
While management science applications to criminal justice ad-
ministration rely heavily on computers, it is not merely the physical
electronic data processing machines that distinguish the management
science posture. Rather, this approach can be recognized by an as-
sortment of quantitative methodologies characteristic of what is popu-
larly known as the "systems approach" to management and planning.1
These methodologies include operations research, systems analysis,
mathematical modeling, statistical analysis and computer simulation.' 2
This Comment will address the issue of whether the "systems
approach" can be successfully applied to the process of criminal justice
administration to solve the problems of congestion, delay and related
systemic dysfunctions. The methodologies of this approach, both tech-
nological and quantitative, and its biases will be explored. The impli-
cations of applying the systems approach, such as the entrusting of the
design and management of the criminal justice adjudicative apparatus
to a technological elite, will also be evaluated. Finally, an assessment
Will be made of various management science applications and of the
appropriateness of grafting the goal of efficient resource deployment
unto criminal justice procedures, especially in light of constitutional
due process guarantees.
I. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL EFFORTS TO COPE WITH COURT
CONGESTION
Despite the sixth amendment's mandate,' 3 it is becoming increas-
ingly difficult to achieve speedy dispositions of criminal cases.14 Iron-
ysis of the Courts, 14 J. LAW & ECON. 61 (1971). See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972). A critique of Posner's work appears at Polinsky, Economic
Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer's Guide to Posner's Economic
Analysis of Law, 87 HAav. L. Rnv. 1665 (1974).
11. See, e.g., C. CHURCHMAN, THE SYSTEMS APPROACH (1968); Howlett & Hurst,
A Systems Approach to Comprehensive Criminal Justice Planning, 17 CRIME & DFLiN.
345 (1971).
12. This perspective was first suggested to me by Professor L. Thorne McCarty,
Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence, State University of New York at Buffalo, in Quan-
titative Methods in Legal Problem Areas: An Experimental Seminar, in Computers,
Society & Law: The Role of Legal Education 121 (J. Leininger & B. Gilchrist eds. 1973,
Proceedings of the AFIPS/Stanford Conference June 25-27, 1973).
13. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
14. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCI.TION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JuSTICE 271 (1974) [herein-
1975]
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ically, when cases are finally adjudicated, it is often with too much
speed to assure compliance with due process. The tremendous rise in
the number of cases before the courts is primarily responsible for pre-
trial delay.' 5 This phenomenon of growing judicial caseloads raises
two important questions: whether crowded court dockets constitute a
valid reason for delaying final adjudication for the accused; or whether,
instead, such delay impinges upon a defendant's sixth amendment
rights.' 6
Both legislatures and courts have directed their attention to these
problems, although with less than satisfactory results. Typical of the
legislative response for dealing with the various aspects of pre-trial
delay is New York's Criminal Procedure Law, section 80.30.17 This so-
called "ready-rule," closely modeled after the rules generated by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals,' 8 provides for dismissal or other sanc-
after cited as ABA SPEEDY TRIAL STANDARDS]. That the "law's delay" is not unique to
the mass-production orientation of the judiciary in the 1970's is well-documented.
See generally W. SHAKESPEARE, HAILET, PRINCE OF DENMARK, Act. III, scene i
(soliloquy of Hamlet) (1603); C. DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (1853); J. MICHAEL &
M. ADLER, CRME, LAw AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (1932); H. ZEISEL, H. KALVEN &
B. BUCHHOLz, DELAY IN THE COURT (1959); and, more recently, Zeisel, Courts for
Methuselah, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 224 (1971) ; Taylor, The Long Wait for a Speedy Trial,
80 CASE & CoM. 3 (1975); N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1975, at 1, col. 3.
15. See Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial: Ohio Follows the Trend, 43 U. CIN.
L. REv. 610, 629 (1974); Comment, Speedy Trials and the Second Circuit Rules Re-
garding Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases, 71 COLUmn. L. REv. 1059, 1061 (1971).
Other causes for delay include: (1) lack of judicial, prosecutorial, defense and correc-
tions manpower and inadequate funding to provide better facilities; (2) scheduling
difficulties due to conflicting commitments of judges, lawyers and corrections officials;
(3) defense and prosecution adjournment requests, due to absence of a necessary party
or witness or because of lack of preparation; (4) pre-trial procedural devices, judicially
established to protect the accused (e.g., hearings on such matters as eyewitness identifi-
cation (United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)), competency (Pate v. Robinson,
383 U.S. 375 (1966)) and validity of confessions (Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368
(1964)); see United States ex rel. Frizer v. McMann, 437 F.2d 1312, 1314-15 (2d
Cir. 1971); Comment, 71 COLUm. L. REv. at 1061-62.
16. In Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967), the Supreme Court held
the speedy trial provision of the sixth amendment to be applicable to the states.
17. N.Y. CRuim. PRO. LAw § 30.30 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
18. 2D Cm. R., APP. These rules differ most significantly from the ABA standards
in their emphasis on prosecutorial readiness for trial, rather than on the timing of the
trial itself. Compare 2D Cm. R. 3-4 with provisions 2.1-2.2 of ABA SPEEDY TRIAL
STANDARDS, supra note 14, at 276. The rationale for the second circuit's failure to deal
with delay due to court congestion was recognized in a recent commentary on the second
circuit rules:
If the rules were directed at court delays, the effect on both the law en-
forcement system and on the legislature would probably be much more dramatic
and, in the short run, much more devastating on the courts. Much, if not most,
of the delay in bringing defendants to trial is the result of the inability of the
courts to handle their growing dockets. Hence the effect of the rules, if applied
to court delays, would probably be to require release and dismissal of charges
in a much greater number of cases than is now necessitated by prosecution delays.
Comment, supra note 15, at 1074.
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tions only "when the people are not ready for trial" within the statu-
torily prescribed time periods. This rule requires only that the district
attorney advise the court, in timely fashion, that s/he is ready to proceed
with the prosecution. 9 The "ready-rule," apparently tolerant of cal-
endar-induced delay, effectively skirts the issue of court congestion as
it pertains to speedy trial.20 In contrast, the recently enacted Speedy
Trial Act of 197421 directs that the 60 day period (measured from the
arraignment date) within which a trial is to be commenced is not to be
extended "because of general congestion of the court's calendar. '22
However, the sanction-dismissal of the information or indictment 23- -
to be imposed for failure to bring the defendant to trial within the spe-
cified time limit will not become effective as part of the statutory
scheme until July 1, 1979.24
The issue has never been squarely decided by the United States
Supreme Court. However, in Barker v. Wingo,25 the Coirt identified
the factors to be weighed in the balancing test applicable to resolv-
ing a claim of alleged unconstitutional delay.26 The Court referred to
docket congestion as a "more neutral reason," but one to be considered
nonetheless "since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances
must rest with the government rather than with the defendant." 27 In his
concurring opinion, Justice White was less equivocal: "[U]nreasonable
delay in run-of-the-mill criminal cases cannot be justified by simply
19. See N.Y. CRIM. PRo. LAw § 30.30 (1) (McKinney Supp. 1975). The problems
of distinguishing court-generated delay from prosecutorial delay are demonstrated in
the following passage:
[T]he District Attorney merely states that he has not moved this case for
trial because of "heavy calendar congestion"; that he has determined to prose-
cute "older cases first", in order of indictment numbers; and that he is now
"ready for trial". The prosecutor acknowledges that his announced "readi-
ness" for trial actually means that these defendants will not be tried for another
six months, and then only after earlier indictments have been disposed of.
People v. Ryan, 72 Misc. 2d 990, 991, 340 N.Y.S.2d 321, 322 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
20. For cases that draw no distinction between prosecutorial delay and court-
caused delay, holding either to constitute grounds for dismissal, see United States v. Ver-
vile, 281 F. Supp. 591 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Hernandez v. State, 40 Ariz. 200, 11 P.2d
356 (1932); In re Vacca, 125 Cal. App. 2d 751, 271 P.2d 162 (1954); State ex rel.
Leon v. Baker, 238 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1970); State v. Cross, 26 Ohio St. 2d 270, 271
N.E.2d 264 (1971); Tate v. Howard, 110 R.I. 641, 296 A.2d 19 (Sup. Ct. 1972.).
21. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (Supp. I. 1975).
22. Id. § 3161(h)(8)(C).
23. Id. § 3162.
24. Id. § 3163(c).
25. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). The Court rejected petitioner Barker's speedy trial
claims; the delay of 5 years had occurred neither through inadvertance nor calendar
congestion, but for tactical reasons.
26. These factors included: length of delay, reason for the delay, defendant's as-
sertion of his right and prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 530.
27. Id. at 531.
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asserting that the public resources provided by the State's criminal
justice system are limited and that each case must await its turn. " 28
Should this thinking govern in a future case presenting the issue of
lengthy delay induced by court-calendar backlog, law enforcement offi-
cials might be faced with the prospect of having to release scores of
those incarcerated for lengthy periods while awaiting trial.29
Most of the judicial opinions concerned with the constitutional
basis for the right to a speedy trial have emphasized the individualistic
purposes supporting that right. The Bill of Rights does, after all, speak
of the rights and interests of the individual rather than those of the
government. Case law has focused on such factors as protection of the
accused against excessive incarceration, minimization of personal anxi-
ety over the adjudicatory process and the reduction of other factors
that might impair a defendant's ability to prepare an adequate de-
fense (e.g., the tendency of memories of parties and witnesses to fade
over time), 0 However, a perceptible attitudinal shift, directly related
28. Id. at 538.
29. See Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets a Fast Shuffle, 72 CoLUst. L.
REv. 1376, 1396-97 (1972).
In its most recent treatment of claims of denial of speedy trial, the New York Court
of Appeals refused to find extensive delay, attributable to calendar congestion and lack
of court facilities, to be sufficient basis to warrant dismissal of the indictments. See
People v. Ganci, 27 N.Y.2d 418, 267 N.E.2d 263, 318 N.Y.S.2d 484, cert. denied,
402 U.S. 924 (1971); People ex rel. Franklin v. Warden, Brooklyn House of De-
tention, 31 N.Y.2d 498, 294 N.E.2d 199, 341 N.Y.S.2d 604 (1973). However, in his
dissenting opinion in Ganci, then Chief Judge Fuld strongly urged that congestion is no
excuse for delay:
A delay of 16 months between the defendant's arraignment and trial-
for which he was not at all responsible-is, in my view, a denial of his due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment . . . . [T]he fact that such
delay was attributable to congested calendar conditions in Nassau County...
seems to me beside the point. As far as the defendant is concerned, he suf-
fered the denial of a speedy trial whether the prosecutor or the court was at
fault or completely blameless.
[I]t is the responsibility of the State . .. to do what is necessary-
by furnishing funds, facilities and personnel-to assure the effective operation
of the judicial system, and that burden may not be shifted to the defendant.
27 N.Y.2d at 430-31, 267 N.E.2d at 270, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 493-94 (Fuld, J., dissenting).
In People ex rel. Franklin v. Warden, the court again denied relief, but it did
order that each of the cases before it be granted a trial preference. The Court acknowl-
edged that this was essentially a stop-gap measure: "The ultimate remedy must be pro-
vision by the appropriate branches of government of the material and personal resources
required to handle a court burden increased and increasing because of higher crime
rates, enlarged police activity, and, most of all, greater urbanization of our population."
31 N.Y.2d at 504, 294 N.E.2d at 202, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 608.
30. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1971); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S.
374 (1969); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966). Writing for the Court in
Barker v. Wingo, Justice Powell noted particularly the disadvantages of lengthy delay
to one who is unable to obtain his/her release prior to trial: "The time spent in jail
[Vol. 25
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to heightened concern over rising levels of crime and violence in the
United States, is occurring. The emphasis on the extent and form of
the protections that society affords individuals in the course of deter-
mining guilt and imposing punishment is being increasingly counter-
balanced by concentrating attention on the ways society can protect
itself from deviant individuals.31
This social interest in the orderly and effective administration of
criminal justice and in the preservation of its institutions is being in-
creasingly articulated as the predominant rationale for prompt dispo-
sition of criminal matters. For example, it is indicated in the ABA's
Standards that speedy trial is considered a priority matter not only
because of the defendant's concern but also because of the public
interest in seeing that justice is speedily done.32 The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, in promulgating its speedy trial rules, empha-
sized that "the public interest requires disposition of criminal charges
with all reasonable dispatch."33 The court did not mention the
accused's individual interest. And the Supreme Court has indicated
that there is a "societal interest in providing a speedy trial which
exists separately from, and at times in opposition to, the interest of
the accused.' 34
awaiting trial . . . often means loss of a job; it disrupts family life; and it enforces idle-
ness." Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 532.
Certain statistical studies have concluded that persons detained in jail prior to final
disposition of their cases are more likely to be convicted and, when convicted, more likely
to receive harsher treatment (i.e., prison sentences), than are those defendants who
obtain pre-trial release. See Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv.
641 (1964); Wald, Pretrial Detention and Ultimate Freedom: A Statistical Study, 39
N.Y.U.L. Rav. 631 (1964); Memorandum for Plaintiff, Bellamy v. Judges & Justices,
32 N.Y.2d 886, 300 N.E.2d 157, 346 N.Y.S.2d 812 (1973) (reprinted as The Unconsti-
tutional Administration of Bail: Bellamy v. The Judges of New York City, 8 CRIM. L.
BULL. 459 (1972)).
31. Among the best recent illustrations of the shift of concern away from protect-
ing the individual to protecting "society" is the trade-off of individual freedom in favor
of societal security as found in the Nixon administration's preventive detention scheme.
See the Nixon administration's "preventive detention" bill, S. 2600, H.R. 12806, 91st
Cong., Ist Sess. (1969); the District of Columbia "preventive detention" law. D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 23-1321-32 (Supp. 1970). Compare Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Con-
stitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 55 VA. L. REv. 1223 (1969) with Tribe, An Ounce
of Detention: Preventive justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. Rv. 371
(1970).
32. ABA SPEEDY TRIAL STANDARDS, supra note 14, at 272.
33. 2D Cm. R., AP., Statement of the Circuit Council to Accompany Second
Circuit Rules Regarding Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases.
34. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1971). A succinct summary of the "so-
cietal interest" in speedy trials is contained in Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in
Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 42 (1970):
The public is concerned with the effective prosecution of criminal cases, both
to restrain those guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating it. Just as
1975]
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The suggestion that a "societal interest" is promoted by speedy
disposition of criminal matters rests on at least two assumptions: that
prompt disposition of criminal cases fosters and is vital to continued
public respect for law enforcement and adjudicatory processes and that,
as a consequence, prompt dispositions have a deterrent effect on
crime.35 As expressed by the Second Circuit:
The general observance of law rests largely upon a respect for the
process of law enforcement. When the process is slowed down by re-
delay may impair the ability of the accused to defend himself, so it may reduce
the capacity of the government to prove its case [citation omitted]. Moreover,
while awaiting trial, an accused who is at large may become a fugitive from
justice or commit other criminal acts. And the greater the lapse of time be-
tween commission of an offense and the conviction of the offender, the less
the deterrent value of his conviction.
35. See "State of the Judiciary-1970" message by Chief Justice Warren Burger
in 56 A.B.A.J. 929 (1970); presentation by Richard M. Nixon to the National Confer-
ence on the Judiciary, March 11, 1971, reprinted in 57 A.B.A.J. 421 (1971).
Chief Judge David L. Bazelon (United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit) has strongly contested the validity of the view that speedy disposi-
tions serve to deter crime:
Increasing currency today is being given to the notion that we can reduce
crime in the street by speeding up the judicial process. I think there is a grave
danger that we have been oversold on the benefits of judicial efficiency. In a
great burst of wishful thinking, many of us seem to have decided that cutting
down on court backlogs will cut down on crime. The theory seems to be that
would-be criminals will in large numbers be deterred from unlawful actions
by the threat of swift punishment but not by the threat of remote punishment.
But in reality, we know next to nothing about the ways in which deterrence
may or may not operate. . . .There is simply no evidence that speeding up
the judicial process is likely to measurably reduce the incidence of crime ...
We are courting disaster . . . if we persuade ourselves that speeding up the
criminal process will cure crime.
Bazelon, New Gods for Old: "Efficient" Courts in a Democratic Society, 46 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 653-54 (1971).
Others have suggested that there may be a direct correlation between violence in
America and poor management in courts that adjudicate criminal matters: "Delays re-
sulting from poor court management ... help to create conditions of disrespect for law
and legal institutions, which in turn can increase the chances for violence in our so-
ciety." Saari, Court Management and the Administration of Justice, in LAW AND ORDER
RECONSmERED at 555.
Professor H. Richard Uviller has suggested a somewhat different and more realistic
emphasis:
Our system for the processing of criminal cases cannot fairly be faulted
for its failure to reduce the incidence of criminal behavior. But the general
dillusionment with the criminal process, from the outside and from within, is a
matter for considerable regret. For, inter alia, we do count upon this system,
awkward as it may be, to gratify our need to believe that our government is
capable of playing a creditable part in the drama of justice. The myth of legal
competence serves our faith in orderly existence, and to the extent that the
criminal process has become a clumsy spectacle, bitterness and cynicism, in-
fecting players as well as public, become as serious a threat to the system as
the original causes of its distress.
Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical Standard: Guidance From the
ABA, 71 MicH. L. REv. 1145, 1167 (1973).
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peated delays in the disposition of charges for which there is no good
reason, public confidence is seriously eroded.3 6
The attitudinal shift toward societal interests reinforces community
values (crime detection and prevention) over the safeguards granted
the accused. It stresses the importance of the proposition that the courts
be perceived by the public as operating efficiently. This primary socio-
legal institution must at least give the appearance of functioning in an
efficient and orderly fashion if citizens are to accord legitimacy to its
pronouncements.
The criminal court is the central institution in the law enforce-
ment machinery. It is the agency that is the "most venerable, the most
formally organized, and the most elaborately circumscribed by law and
tradition . . . the institution around which the rest of the system is
in large measure responsible."'3 7 Dysfunction, in the form of congestion
and delay, in this core institution, will inevitably reverberate through-
out the entire criminal justice process.
The dismal crime control record of the law enforcement and
adjudicative agencies is well documented.38 This inability of the
criminal justice institutions to deal effectively with the "crime problem"
has led to close scrutiny of the administrative apparatus for law enforce-
ment and crime control. The extensive study of crime and criminal
procedure in America by the President's Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and Administration of Justice has provoked a flood of criticism
towards what has popularly come to be called the "Criminal Justice
System." Some of the harshest criticism has been directed at the very
concept of a "system" of criminal justice administration. The belief
that there is a "system" has been categorized as simply a myth:
A system implies some unity of purpose and organized interrela-
tionship among component parts. In the typical American city and
state, and under federal jurisdiction as well, no such relationship
exists. There is, instead, a reasonably well-defined criminal process,
a continuum through which each accused offender may pass: from
the hands of the police, to the jurisdiction of the courts, behind the
36. 2D Cut. R., App., Statement of the Circuit Council to Accompany Second Cir-
cuit Rules Regarding Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases.
37. CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY at 311.
38. Well over half of all crimes are never reported to the police. Of those which
are reported, fewer than 25% result in arrest. Almost one-half of all arrests result in the
dismissal of charges. Of those not dismissed, over 90% are resolved through plea bar-
gaining. The percentage of cases actually exposed to trial is less than 1% of all crimes
committed. Of those convicted, sentenced to jails or prisons and 'eventually released,
between 40% and 70% are eventually re-arrested and re-convicted. Id. at 89-100.
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walls of a prison, then back onto the street. The inefficiency, fallout,
and failure of purpose during this process is notorious.3
9
Responding to a perceived need to rationalize the disjointed
"nonsystem of criminal justice" into a coherent, coordinated Criminal
Justice System, 40 Congress prescribed that federal funds be allocated
to state criminal justice planning agencies to develop "comprehensive
statewide plan[s] for the improvement of law enforcement and criminal
justice."41 .The era of the total system approach to criminal justice
planning and administration had arrived. The desired objective would
be a synchronized managerial process, into which the reported crimes
and apprehended criminal suspects would be fed. These "inputs"
would then, ideally, be processed efficiently and expeditiously by the
various components of the system-the police, prosecution, courts and
corrections. The "output," beyond simply "crimes cleared" or "cases
processed," would presumably remain the nebulous "product" of
justice, both for the individual and for society.
With the failure of the legislatures and courts to provide solutions
for problems generated by growing criminal court backlogs, the ad-
ministrators of our criminal justice institutions have been forced to
act. In their attempts to preserve, and in some instances to salvage, the
institutions they oversee they are becoming increasingly reliant on
management science techniques for streamlining, economizing and
"systemitizing" their agencies' operations. The discussion that follows
will focus primarily on two applications of the "systems approach" to
39. LAW AND ORDER RECONSIDERED, supra note 3, at 264. One reason offered for
the failure of this non-system is the fact of its unaccountability-except to itself. See Wolf-
gang, Making the Criminal Justice System Accountable, 18 CRIME AND DELIN. 15 (1972).
40. See TASK FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 8, at 53-67.
This report was prepared by the Institute for Defense Analyses under the overall dircc-
tion of Dr. Alfred Blumstein. Dr. Blurnstein's own work is critiqued below at notes
153-91 infra & accompanying text. The now familiar chart, "A general view of The
Criminal Justice System," which described the criminal justice process schematically in
flow-chart fashion, indicating relative volumes of cases disposed of at various points in
the criminal justice administrative process, was developed by the Science and Technology
Task Force. Id. at 58-59. The chart has been incorporated by the standard texts on
criminal law and procedure. See, e.g., S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAwe AND
ITS PROCESSES 677 (2d ed. 1969); Y. KAmISAR, W. LA FAvE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 16-17 (4th ed. 1974).
41. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.A. § 3723
(b) (1) (1973). Coordination of various planning efforts was placed under the authority
of State Planning Agencies which are responsible to and receive their funding from the
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration within the Department of Justice. I'd.
§ 3711 (a). For an extensive description and critique of LEAA, see The Law Enforce-
ment Assistance Administration: A Symposium on its Operation and Impact, 5 COLUM.
HUMAN RIGHTS L. REv. 1, 1-214 (1973).
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the problems of criminal justice administration and comprehensive
planning. First, a management information system as utilized by a
prosecutor to structure his staff's decision-making and routine activities
will be explored in some detail. The implications, for both those
accused of crime and for the courts, of the prosecutor's use of this
management science tool will be considered as well. Attention will then
be focused briefly on managerial and data-processing techniques that
have been implemented in many courts. These efforts to achieve in-
creased speed, increased production and lower costs in the context of
judicial administration will be evaluated. Finally, a formal computer
model that enables one to simulate various aspects of the criminal
justice system will be used as a vehicle to examine the scientific man-
agement techniques and technologies utilized by the "systems" prac-
titioners in criminal justice planning and policy formulation. The
model, Justice System Interactive Model (JUSSIM), will be described
and the implications of decision-makers relying on such a formal model
to structure criminal justice policy will be explored.
II. PROSECUTOR'S MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM (PROMIS)
The prosecutor is in a critical position of influence within the law
enforcement and adjudicatory schema.4 Exercising the broad discretion
traditionally accorded him,43 the prosecutor decides whether or not to
42. The prosecutor is recognized as the most influential court official except for
the judge. CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY at 362. Mr. Justice Robert Jack-
son, while serving as Attorney General, found the prosecutor's influence even more
far-reaching:
The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any
other person in America. His discretion is tremendous. He can have citizens
investigated and . . . he can have this done to the tune of public statements
and veiled or unveiled intimations. Or the prosecutor may choose a more
subtle course and simply have a citizen's friends interviewed. The prosecutor
can order arrests, present cases to the grand jury in secret session, and on the
basis of his one-sided presentation of the facts, can cause the citizen to be in-
dicted and held for trial.
Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 JUDICATURE 18 (1940).
43. See, e.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); Inmates of Attica Correctional
Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973); Arnold, Law Enforcement-An At-
tempt at Social Dissection, 42 YALE L.J. 1 (1932). Professor Kenneth Davis has suc-
cinctly summarized the "set of universally accepted assumptions" that support the
exercise of broad prosecutorial discretion:
The principal assumptions are that the prosecuting power must of course be
discretionary, that statutory provisions as to what enforcement officers "shall"
do may be freely violated without disapproval from the public or from other
officials, that determinations to prosecute or not to prosecute may be made
secretly without any statement of findings or reasons, that such decisions by a
top prosecutor of a city or county or state usually need not be reviewable by
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charge an individual in police custody with a crime, what charge to
file against the individual and what disposition to finally recommend.
While prosecutorial discretion has generally been examined in the
context of crime prevention and enforcement policy,44 it can also be
considered as an aspect of the prosecutor's managerial role in relation
to disposition of cases. The nature of the decisions taken and the timing
of these decisions enable the prosecutor to play a pivotal role in eltorts
to stabilize the chaotic conditions of criminal court administration.
The prosecutor exercises his/her discretion to carefully monitor those
cases allowed to proceed to adjudication. S/he can prevent the courts
from becoming unnecessarily clogged with cases that do not merit
prosecution and thus ultimately assist in remedying the congested
condition of these courts. From this managerial perspective, the prose-
cutor is to
preclude random access to [the court's] limited adjudicative resources,
and preserve these resources for the timely judgment of the matters to
which the public attaches priority. It is in this sense that the prose-
any other administrative authority, and that decisions to prosecute or not to
prosecute are not judicially reviewable for abuse of discretion.
K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 188-89 (1969). In recent years a number of judicial
opinions and commentaries (in addition to Professor Davis') have challenged this tra-
ditional -view. The most important recent case is United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616
(7th Cir. 1973) (en banc). Falk has been discussed in Comment, Curbing the Prose-
cutor's Discretion: United States v. Falk, 9 HARv. Civ. R oHTS-Civ. LiB. L. REv. 372
(1974); Comment, The Ramifications of United States v. Falk on Equal Protection from
Prosecutorial Discrimination, 65 J. C~ium. L.C. & P.S. 62 (1974); Note, 72 MICH L.
REv. 1113 (1974); Note, 34 OHIO ST. L. J. 942 (1973). See also United States v,
Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972); People v. Gray, 254 Cal. App. 2d 256,
63 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1967); People v. Walker, 14 N.Y.2d 901, 200 N.E.2d 779, 252
N.Y.S.2d 96 (1964); People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 225 N.Y.S.2d
128 (4th Dep't 1962); Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 19 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1 (1971); Amsterdam, The One-Sided Sword: Selective
Prosecution in Federal Courts, 6 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 1 (1974); Givelber, The Ap-
plication of Equal Protection Principles to Selective Enforcement of the Criminal Law,
1973 U. ILL. L.F. 88; LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18
Am. J. ComP. L. 532 (1970); Winston, On Treating Like Cases Alike, 62 CALIF. L.
REV. 1 (1974); Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion-A Re-Evaluation of the Prosecutor's
,Unbridled Discretion and its Potential for Abuse, 21 DE PAUL L. Rxv. 485 (1971);
Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Initiation of Criminal Complaints, 42 S. CAL.
L. REV. 519 (1969).
44. See, e.g., F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT
,WITH A CRim4 5-7 (1970) (this study contains an empirical analysis of current practices
in prosecutorial discretion at chs. 8-20); THE PRESMENT'S CobIbussioN ON LAW EN-
FORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS
5, 72 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TAsK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS]; Arnold, Law
Enforcement-An Attempt at Social Dissection, 42 YALE L.J. 1, 18 (1832); Baker,
The Prosecutor-Initiation ofProsecution, 23 J. CRier. L. C. & P. S. 770-71 (1933);
Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 174 (1965);
commentaries cited at note 43 supra.
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cutor serves as the guardian, protector, and custodian of the commu-
nity's scarce -resources for adjudication.45
Chief justice Warren Burger is among an apparently growing con-
tingent that has concluded that more money and additional judges will
not alone solve the problems of the criminal courts. According to
Justice Burger, at least some blame is attributable to "the failure to
apply the techniques of modern business to the administration of
the purely mechanical operations of the courts." 46
Management within business and industrial organizations suggests
goals, allocates resources, guides actions and evaluates programs on
many different levels. 47 The emphasis in business is on the rational
nature of the manager's activity.48 The manager's concern is with the
total environment of the organization, the total system: this "systems
approach" to comprehensive planning does not focus on each separate
element of the business alone, in isolation, but allows the manager to
see the elements as parts of a whole.49 But, as has been recognized by a
leading practitioner of the "systems approach," there is one underlying
managerial objective to which all of the previously articulated ob-
jectives are clearly subsidiary: the "efficiency of operations," or, more
simply, the objective of reducing costs.
Any manager who is alert looks around his system and discerns where
unreasonable wastes are occurring; if he's a good manager, he does
his best to eliminate these wastes in order to reduce the total costs of
operation of the system.
Cost means the using up of resources. It is usually measured in
terms of dollars, but very often the real costs can be thought of in
terms of time or physical resources or men. Every time a dollar is
spent, or a man is used to perform a task, or a physical resource is
burned up in some way, then there is a lost opportunity for doing
45. Hamilton & Work, The Prosecutor's Role in the Urban Court System: The
Case for Management Consciousness, 64 J. C~iu. L.C. & P.S. 183 (1973).
46. Burger, supra note 35 (emphasis added). The biases of this approach are clearly
disclosed in a more recent pronouncement by the Chief Justice: "I would begin ... by
giving priority to methods and machinery, to procedures and techniques, to management
and administration of judicial resources even over the much-needed reexamination of
substantive legal institutions." NATIONAL ADvisoRY COmmIssION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STANDARDS AND GOALS, COURTS 171 (1973).
47. See A. ETZIONI, MODERN ORGANIZATIONS (1964); L. SAYLBS, MANAGERIAL
BEHAVIOR: ADMINISTRATION IN COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS (1964).
48. Saari, Court Management and the Administration of Justice, in LAW AND
ORDER RECONSIDERED at 556.
49. C. CHURCHMAN, THE SYSTEMS APPROACH 44 (1968); G. STEINER, Top MAN-
AGEMENT PLANNING 66 (1969).
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other kinds of jobs .... [The system manager] is concerned to keep
the efficiency of his system at the highest peak so that every dollar
spent is spent correctly and contributes to the real objectives of the
system.50
In his managerial capacity as "custodian of the community's ad-
judicative resources," the prosecutor can act in a variety of ways to
achieve "efficiency of operations" and thereby, by this measure, to foster
the improved administration of criminal justice. S/he must exercise
active control over the office's caseload by establishing and applying
priorities ("suggesting goals" and "allocating resources") to cases
brought to his/her attention.5 1 This goal can be accomplished by
identifying those cases in which aggressive prosecution is warranted
as a matter of enforcement policy and by monitoring those cases to
assure that they are neither unintentionally overlooked nor kept from
final adjudication by impediments within the judicial process. The
prosecutor can keep apprised of the number and reasons for postpone-
ments in a case and can coordinate the appearances of all principals in
each case. S/he can ensure that cases do not atrophy while awaiting
adjudication because of misplaced or lost records.5 2 The prosecutor who
can handle these factors will be better able to guide the actions of
his office in interaction with other criminal justice agencies. In addition,
the prosecutor can regularly assess the activities of the office to assure
that limited resources are optimally allocated ("evaluates programs" and
"reduces costs").53
Finally, because the prosecutor occupies "the most favorable posi-
tion to bring about needed coordination among the various law
enforcement and correctional agencies in the community,"5 4 s/he can
evaluate the overall performance of criminal justice administration
by identifying problem areas and systemic dysfunctions and by suggest-
ing remedial procedures ("his concern is the total environmental," "sees
the separate elements as parts of the whole"). 5 This aspect of the
50. C. CHURCHMAN, supra note 49, at 17.
51. Hamilton & Work, supra note 45, at 184.
52. Hamilton, Modern Management for the Prosecutor, 7 THE PROSECUTOR, J.
DisRIcT ATTORNEY Ass'N 472, 473 (1971).
53. Id.
54. TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS, supra note 44, at 72.
55. Hamilton, Modern Management for the Prosecutor, supra note 52, at 473. But
see Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Initiation of Criminal Complaints, 42 S.
CAL. L. REV. 519, 521 (1969), where it is suggested that even assuming the prosecutor
to be the law enforcement officer most knowledgeable about criminals' activities, it does
not follow that s/he should be entrusted with defining the goals and establishing the social
policies that are the foundations of our institutions of criminal justice administration.
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prosecutor's managerial role could lead to: (1) conducting research
into the incidences of crime, for example, by the status of the accused
(i.e., crimes committed by first offenders, by those on bail or probation,
by multiple offenders); (2) cataloging and publishing patterns and
trends in criminal activity as a public educational aid and as a guide
for other governmental agencies concerned with crime detection and
prevention; (3) identifying those areas in the criminal courts where
congestion and delay are most detrimental to effective judicial adminis-
tration; and (4) recommending remedies for such delay. The prose-
cutor's actions can also have a significant impact on police arrest prac-
tices, on the numbers of accused diverted to "adjunct" criminal justice
programs prior to adjudication, and on the number of offenders
referred to the "correctional" institutions.
But in many jurisdictions there are tremendous obstacles to the
realization of this managerial potential within the prosecutor's office.
Since most urban prosecutors are saddled with burgeoning caseloads
and have neither adequate staffs nor resources to meet this exigency,
most prosecutorial energies are consumed in simply meeting the daily
trial schedule. Little if any time remains "for developing policies
within the office or for attempting to coordinate the efforts of other
agencies."5 The enormous prosecutorial caseloads have encouraged an
assembly line approach in many urban prosecutors' offices:
[In a large office, one attorney may make the initial decision to file
a charge, a second may argue the bail issue, and still others may handle
the preliminary hearing, grand jury proceeding, and the trial. At
each of these stages, a number of prosecutors may contemporaneously
be performing the same function in different cases. These separate
decision-makers may not be in direct communication with each other,
and their decisions may not be subject to a central internal review.57
This scenario of fragmented decision-making, of a lack of co-
herency in and poor coordination of internal policy, is consistent with
a traditional image of the prosecutor as a reactive rather than a man-
agerial agent. As a former Assistant U.S. Attorney has recognized:
"[T]he psychological make-up and role definition of the assistant
[U.S. Attorney] were usually such that he would prosecute in the
Judges, after all, can claim at least an equal knowledge of and expertise in dealing with
law enforcement and administration problems.
56. TAsK FORCE REPORT: THE CouRTs, supra note 44, at 72.
57. Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19
U.C.L.A.L. Rpv. 1, 2 (1971).
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absence of any reason not to do so."8 Others have concluded from the
available evidence that prosecutorial decision-making is not necessarily
"conscious" in the sense that prosecutors exert affirmative control over
their workloads.59 Rather, prosecutors do not tend to
consciously exercise their discretion in accordance with the value judg-
ments which are legitimately theirs to make, and in light of their ex-
pert knowledge .... A likely explanation of many prosecutorial de-
cisions is that they are simply reactive; a prosecutor makes yes or no
decisions with respect to the cases which citizens or the police bring
before him, and the basis for making those decisions may not be uni-
form.60
In addition to those handicaps already identified (generally un-
favorable working conditions, a lack of clearly stated standards to guide
decision-making and a lack of established procedures for arriving at
decisions(1), the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Ad-
ministration of Justice has recognized yet another deterrent to the
"systematic making of charge decisions": the lack of sufficient informa-
.jion on which to base decisions. Concluding that "more often than
not prosecutors exercise their discretion under circumstances and in
ways that make unwise decisions all too likely," 62 the President's Com-
mission urged that more attention be paid to gathering detailed
background information about offenders so that the prosecutor may
differentiate between dangerous persons and those who are merely
marginal offenders. Without such background information on the
accused, the prosecutor is unable to establish priorities and concentrate
his efforts accordingly. Instead s/he must resort to a best-guess or rule-
of-thumb policy in arriving at charging decisions.
To enable prosecutors to re-establish control over workloads, it has
been suggested that the computer be utilized within the framework of
a comprehensive management information system. 63 In 1969, the office
of the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia 4 was among
58. Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 174,
192-93 (1965).
59. See CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY at 329-32; Abrams, supra note
57, at 8-9; Givelber, The Application of Equal Protection Principles to Selective En-
forcement of the Criminal Law, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 88, 103.
60. Givelber, supra note 59, at 103 (emphasis added).
61. CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY at 330-31.
62. Id. at 330.
63. Work, A Prosecutor's Guide to Automation, 7 THE PROSECUTOR, J. DSTIucT
ATTORNEY Ass'N 479 (1971).
64. In the District of Columbia, the U.S. Attorney is the public prosecutor for
common law as well as federal crimes. Hamilton & Work, supra note 45, at 184.
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the growing number of urban prosecutors who, faced with the problem
of prosecuting thousands of cases, were compelled to resort to a mass-
production case-processing strategy.65 It is understandable that such
prosecutors would be receptive to innovative approaches to managing
their workload. Aided by a grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration (LEAA), the U.S. Attorney for the District of Co-
lumbia, in cooperation with the Office of Crime Analysis of the District
of Columbia, designed a computer-based information and processing
system capable of tracing defendants through the various agencies of
criminal justice. A team consisting of systems analysts, a criminologist
and two Assistant U.S. Attorneys developed the system which was im-
plemented by the U.S. Attorney's office in January, 1971.66
The project's originators claim that this Prosecutor's Management
Information System (dubbed with the acronym "PROMIS"'67) is the
first tool developed specifically for the prosecutor that integrates (1) the
demands placed on the prosecutor from an operational perspective with
(2) modern statistical and quantitative analytical techniques and (3) the
computer's capacity to rapidly sort through and examine vast amounts
of data and to then present this data in a useful format to the prose-
cutor.68 This data can then be applied to expedite the effective prose-
cution of a large volume of cases and to facilitate planning and
management decisions.
PROMIS was intended by its designers to overcome the handicaps
discussed above in order to aid the prosecutor in achieving improve-
ments in several major functional areas. According to PROMIS advo-
cates, the initial benefit is to be realized through the process of thinking
through and structuring the design of a management information
system. This phase of implementation is to entail a thorough study
and analysis of all the procedures, functions and activities of the prose-
65. Id.
66. Watts & Work, Developing an Automated Information System for the Prose-
cutor, 9 Am. GRIM. -L.Q. 164 (1970). Messrs. Watts and Work were the two Assistant
U.S. Attorneys assigned to the project development team. Mr. William Hamilton (see
notes 45 & 52 supra & note 70 infra), currently the president of the Institute for Law
and Social Research located in Washington, D.C., was the Project Manager for the
design and implementation of this comprehensive management information system.
67. As a critic of the management science approach to criminal justice has noted:
Flashy code-words dominate the [management science] field-many of
them composed of acronyms or abbreviations . . . . [Management Science]
models are products themselves which are marketed to law enforcement
agencies, courts and other institutions. Their abbreviated code-words empha-
size their involvement with computer technology and streamlined problem-
solving.
Reich, Operations Research and Criminal Justice, 22 J. PuB. L. 357, 371 n.54 (1973).
68. Watts & Work, supra note 66, at 168-69.
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cutor's office which are to be subjected to computer manipulation.
As one advocate of PROMIS applications has written:
This process will very likely surface some weaknesses in the adminis-
trative operation of the office .... [T]he payoff in increased under-
standing of the strengths and weaknesses of the administrative process
by itself justifies the exercise of designing a management information
system. 9
The first and primary task of the operational PROMIS system
is to receive, sort, classify, file and store large amounts of easily acces-
sible information that has been collected on those taken into police
custody. This data base in turn serves as the foundation from which
the rest of the PROMIS operations are built. As recognized in the
PROMIS explanatory literature: "PROMIS is synonymous with facts-
almost 170 of them for every case." 70 The facts programmed into
PROMIS can be divided into six major categories of information
about:
(1) the accused (e.g., name, sex; race, prior record, history of
alcohol or drug use);
(2) the crime (date, time, place and a numerical rating that reflects
the gravity of the offense in terms of amount and degree of bodily
injury, property damage and intimidation);
(3) the arrest;
(4) criminal charges (including reasons for any charge changes
made by the prosecutor);
(5) court events (including dates of all court appearances and
final disposition; names of judges, defense and prosecuting at-
torneys and the reasons for the outcome of each appearance);
(6) witnesses.71
69. Work, supra note 63, at 480. This claim is made throughout the management
science literature. It is doubtful, however, that an administrator who expends large sums
to develop a management information system would find this benefit, alone, to be an
adequate return on his investment.
70. INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND SOCIAL RESEARCH, PROMIS BRIEFING SERIES No. 1,
MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW OF PROMIS 6-7 (1974) [hereinafter cited as BRIEFING SERIES].
The Series consists of 21 briefing papers that explain the underlying managerial and
organizational concepts inherent in PROMIS. These publications are prepared by the
Institute for Law and Social Research under a grant from LEAA. LEAA has designated
PROMIS an "exemplary project," worthy of national attention and suitable for adoption
by other communities. Id. at Forward.
71. Id. at 7. About 80% of the data programmed into PROMIS is gathered at
the intake and screening stage of the criminal process. Id. at 8; BRIEFING SERIES No. 2,
CASE SCREENING 5 (1974).
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It was hoped that prosecutors working in mass-production environ-
ments would benefit because, with ready access to these data, they could
"achieve technologically the same detailed knowledge of their caseload
and operational problems that small-town prosecutors acquire as a
matter of course with regard to their relatively light workloads." 2
Resource allocation has been recognized as the most important
aspect of PROMIS. This process entails the assigning of "scarce man-
power" in the prosecutor's office to criminal cases based on the serious-
ness of the cases and their urgency for trial. The U.S. Attorney wanted
to identify the more important cases among the thousands flowing
through his office to assure that the prosecution would not inadvertently
fail to try them. There is a concern that "important" cases, hidden by
the sheer volume of the caseload, might be overlooked. This concern
has apparently arisen from what is perceived to be the prosecutor's
experience with the "habitual, court-wise criminal":
The environment is ripe for exploitation by the habitual criminal.
His recidivism buried in the anonymity of large-scale, assembly-line
case processing, he seeks one delay and postponement after another
until the government's witnesses are so exasperated and worn out, or
the memories of the crime so obscured, that the charges against him
are either dropped or dismissed.73
The uniform case evaluation and rating capability of PROMIS was
developed to combat this alleged phenomenon. Four criteria were es-
tablished to assess the importance of a case. These include:
(1) seriousness of the crime, based primarily on the extent of
personal injury, amount of property loss and intimidation; 74
72. Id. at 6-7.
73. Hamilton, supra note 52, at 472; BRIEFING SERIES No. 1, supra note 70, at 2.
No statistical data has been presented to substantiate the extent to which judicial ad-
ministration problems are created or exacerbated by the "habitual, court-wise criminal."
74. The scale incorporated into PROMIS was adopted, with only minor modifi-
cations, from one developed by the criminologists Thorsten Sellin & Marvin B. Wolf-
gang. For background information about this scale see T. SELLIN & M. WOLFGANG,
THE MEASUREMENT OF DELINQUENCY 236-91 (1961). Pre-established numerical values
or weights are assigned to certain factors associated with the crime. For example, if the
victim is hospitalized, a weight of 7 is assigned; but if the victim is killed, a weight of
26 would apply (extent of personal injury). If the evidence indicates that only physical
or verbal force was used, the assigned weight is 2; for display of a weapon, a weight of 4
(intimidation). If the dollar value of property loss was less than $10.00, a weight of 1
applies; if over $200.00, the weight is 4. See BRIEFING SERIES No. 3, UNIFORM CASE
EVALUATION AND RATING 4-7 (1974). These numerical values are then summed in the




(2) seriousness of the accused's criminal record, with emphasis on
the number and density of prior arrests; 7
(3) the age of the case, calculated in terms of the number of con-
tinuances or postponements;
(4) a subjectively determined factor that reflects the probability of
winning the case.76
Data relevant to these categories, which have been obtained by the
screening prosecutor with the assistance of the arresting officer, is then
entered in PROMIS 7 The computer interprets the data and assigns
two ratings to each case, one for the crime and the other for the de-
fendant. The higher the rating, the more important the case. Well in
advance of each trial date, the computer automatically provides a
"priority calendar" which ranks each case scheduled for that trial date
in descending order of importance7 8 These reports enable the prose-
cutor to assign these "important" cases to a Special Litigation Unit.
This Unit provides continuous, concentrated monitoring of all serious
cases and of those cases involving repeat offenders, to assure that each
case is individually prepared. The conviction rate in the cases handled
by the Special Litigation Unit has been reported to be approximately
25% higher than for those cases disposed of in the ordinary process
(during 1970) before PROMIS was implemented.7
75. The factors evaluated by PROMIS to assess the gravity of the defendant's
criminal history were adopted, again with minor modifications, from a scale originated
by Don Gottfredson. See Gottfredson & Ballard, Differences in Parole Decisions Asso-
ciated with Decision-Makers, 3 J. RESEARCH IN CRIME & DELIN. 112 (1966). In addi-
tion, see D. Gottfredson & R. Beverly, Development and Operational Use of Prediction
Methods in Correctional Work (Proceedings of the Social Statistics Section of the
American Statistical Association, Washington, D.C., 1962) and D. Gottfredson & J.
Bonds, A Manual for Intake Base Expectancy Scoring, April 1, 1961 (Form CDC-
BEGIA, California Department of Corrections, Research Division, Sacramento) (as cited
at Hamilton & Work, supra note 45, at 185 n.6). A summing procedure (similar to that
followed for the crime gravity rating) is based on pre-established numerical values con-
noting the relative significance of the answers. Prior arrest record was at first the sole
criterion evaluated by PROMIS. But as conviction data is becoming more available,
research has been started to determine the appropriate weights. See BRIEFING SERIES
No. 3, supra note 74, at 5, 8-9.
76. Hamilton, supra note 52, at 474.
77. See BRIEFING SERIES No. 13, CRIME ANALYSIS WORKSHEET; BRIEFING SERIES
No. 2, supra note 71.
78. BRIEFING SERIES No. 3, supra note 74, at 5. The screening prosecutor can still
exercise his discretion to place a case at the top of the priority calendar, regardless of
its rating, by scoring the "override" box on the Crime Analysis Worksheet. This action
might be taken if the accused is a well-known or major violator. Id. at 10.
79. BRIEFING SERIES No. 4, SPECIAL LITIGATION (MAJOR VIOLATORS) UNIT 3
(1974); Work, supra note 63, at 480.
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At present these computer-generated priority rankings are not
followed mechanistically by the supervising prosecutor. Rather, they
are used as a "crude indicator" of those cases deserving special atten-
tion and preparation. The efforts to incorporate conviction data into
the criminal history formula,80 indicate that the PROMIS rating
capabilities are being refined to serve as a more reliable guide to
decision-making. 81
Other functional areas addressed by PROMIS include:
1. Operational processing and management control. In addition
to automating purely clerical tasks (e.g., automatic printouts of sub-
poenas, notifications to witnesses and police of hearing-date changes),82
PROMIS computer capabilities can be used by the prosecutor to mon-
itor problems in his own staff's performance: "[P]roblems in staffing
and training. . . can be assessed since the name of the assistant prose-
cutor responsible for each transaction in a case is stored in the system
along with the outcome of the transaction and reasons for the out-
come."
83
2. Research and analysis. It is claimed that computer soft-ware is
being developed to identify trends in criminal activity, assess the
effectiveness of prosecution policies and perform studies of special
issues."4 It is predicted that constructing a model simulating the court
process will allow for manipulation and exploration of alternative
policies.85
80. See note 75 supra.
81. Telephone interview with William A. Hamilton, President, Institute for Law
& Social Research (Washington, D.C.), April 29, 1975.
82. Hamilton, supra note 52, at 474.
83. Id. at 475. Although beyond the scope of this paper, it would be interesting
to examine the impact of PROMIS implementation on the way prosecutors and their
assistants perceive their roles (ie., before and after PROMIS adoption), as well as the
impact of PROMIS on job performance. It should be valuable to follow the evolution
of the prosecutor's role as "information processing" becomes integrated with his other
capacities.
84. See BRIEFING SERIES No. 10, RESEARCH USES OF PRomss DATA (1974). Three
preliminary studies have already been completed. These included: (1) a study of police
arrest charges which failed to meet criteria established by the prosecutor; (2) an exam-
ination of the rearrest probability for persons on various forms of conditional release and
the nature of the offense involved; (3) a comparison between cases where complainant
and defendants were related and those in which the parties were strangers. See Merrill,
Using the PROMIS Tacking System for Criminal justice Evaluation, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON CR IMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION AND STATISTICS
SYSTEMS 231, 233 (1972). Other studies on issues such as plea bargaining, speedy trial,
recidivism and judicial decision-making are contemplated. BRIEFING SERIES No. 10, at
10-12.
85. See Hamilton, supra note 52, at 475; BRIEFING SERIES No. 10, at 6. See also
notes 153-91 infra & accompanying text, dicussing various simulations and models of
the court and criminal justice systems.
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3. Interagency coordination. PROMIS automatically generates re-
ports on case status and disposition to other criminal justice agencies.
A major impediment to effective communication among the criminal
justice administration agencies has been the lack of a common classi-
fication system.86 As part of Project TRACE,8 7 PROMIS was equipped
to track the criminal court workload by three separate approaches: 8
(a) by crime: using the complaint number assigned by the police
department, the prosecutor can follow all court action arising
from the crime;
(b) by individual: using the finger-print-based number assigned
by the police to an individual following arrest, the prosecutor can
accumulate criminal history files on offenders and record incidents
of recidivism;
(c) by case: the docket number assigned by the court to the case
pending before it, allows the prosecutor to follow a formal criminal
action from arraignment through final disposition and thus
account for separate outcomes for each count or charge.
Including these three identifiers appears simple, but it is apparently
unique to PROMIS. The numbers provide the prosecutor with an
"instant replay" capability so that s/he can track either the criminal
incident, the defendant or the court actions in each case. Use of the
identifiers also facilitates communication among the various criminal
justice agencies.89
In February, 1973, the second stage in the development of
PROMIS was implemented. PROMIS II is an "on-line," "real-time"
version of PROMIS. It allows a user to retrieve case information im-
86. This was pointed out in a 1968 National Bureau of Standards study of criminal
justice:
(1) Each element of the CJS uses its own individual number for record keeping.
(2) Alphabetical files are sometimes the only means of tying cases together among
agencies. As a result, there are search problems with aliases, misspellings, etc. (one
defendant's name appeared 124 different ways in the alphabetical files).
(3) No single dossier is available to tell the whole story of a defendant's passage
through the process: different data are filed in different buildings, generated and
administered by different agencies.
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, A COMPILATION AND
USE OF CRIMINAL COURT DATA IN RELATION TO PRE-TRIAL RELEASE OF DEFENDANTS
(1968).
87. For a description of Project Trace (Tracking, Retrieval and Analysis of
Criminal Events), see Hamilton, supra note 52, at 473.
88. BRIEFING SEIES No. 1, supra note 70, at 7-8.




mediately through terminals located in the prosecutor's office and at
each police district station house.90 Designated pre-formatted questions
may be directed to the data base and the answer will be flashed back
immediately on a television-like screen. Information that can be re-
trieved in this manner includes: 91 (1) all data relevant to any case
contained in PROMIS; (2) a listing of all cases that have been pending
at a certain stage in the proceedings; (8) all cases in which a particular
police officer is scheduled to appear; (4) docket number and status of
any pending cases in which a defendant is a principal.
In addition, PROMIS and PROMIS II are apparently quite com-
patible with other currently employed criminal data systems. PROMIS
II is an integral aspect of a "real-time metropolitan Washington crim-
inal justice communications network which includes a number of
other systems, such as a wanted persons file and a stolen vehicle tag
file, and which is directly linked to the National Crime Information
Center." 92 There has been a flexibility built into PROMIS which
would enable it to "dovetail" or "interface" with a national criminal
justice information network that has been proposed by LEAA.9 One
facet of this Comprehensive Data Systems would involve the develop-
ment of Computerized Criminal Histories (CCH), storing data on the
identity, location, characteristics and description of known criminal
offenders. Computerized Criminal Histories would not only be stored
centrally, they would also be nationally indexed by the FBI's NCIC.
They would be instantly retrievable by any qualified criminal justice
agency in any state.94 PROMIS can supply most information needed
from the local level by the CCH systems9 5
III. CRITIQUE OF PROMIS
To the extent that PROMIS fosters the effective administration
of justice by removing (or at least alleviating) management and op-
erational obstacles in both the prosecutor's office and the criminal
90. BRIEFING SERIES No. 1, supra note 70, at 13; Hamilton & Work, supra note 45,
at 188.
91. Id.
92. Hamilton & Work, supra note 45, at 188. The National Crime Information
Center (NCIC) is operated by the FBI. See generally A. WESTIN & M. BAKER, DATA-
BANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY 47-64 (1972). But see A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY
162-63 (1971).
93. BRIEFING SERIES No. 17, supra note 89, at 2.
94. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMIISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AN4D
GOALS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 33-35 (1973).
95. BRIEFING SERIES No. 17, supra note 89, at 2. Other data systems with which
PROMIS can be linked are discussed in id. at 2-3.
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courts, criticism of it would appear to be unwarranted. However,
PROMIS does pose certain problems for both the individual facing
prosecution and for the court which, under the separation of powers
doctrine, must be vigilant in maintaining its independence from execu-
tive agencies such as the prosecutor's office.
The PROMIS economic model presents the prosecutor's discre-
tionary acts as those of a "rational maximizer," comparing "expected
returns and expected costs with alternative uses of its resources."00
Under this formulation the prosecutor uses PROMIS' case-rating
capabilities purely as a tool to identify the most serious cases and to
assign resources to minimize the number of overlooked or ill-prepared
cases. In this way, the number of successful prosecutions would be
maximized. However, it is precisely at this core of PROMIS that the
economic and managerial goal of maximum efficiency in the allocation
of scarce resources ("optimization"), 97 and methodologies relied on to
achieve the goal, may conflict with equal protection and due process
requirements. Reliance on PROMIS' "priority listing system" to isolate
and assign certain categories of cases to a Special Litigation Unit for
intensive preparation may significantly enhance the prosecutor's efforts
to control crime. But at the same time, this listing capability signifi-
cantly increases the potential for discriminatory treatment of certain
individuals, such as those with records of multiple arrests, those with
a history of drug use and members of socially or politically disfavored
groups. This clash of values calls for careful scrutiny of how the prose-
cutor uses PROMIS to guide his exercise of discretion, so that possible
abuses can be anticipated and avoided through the implementation
of appropriate safeguards.
It has always been difficult to draw the line between "selective
enforcement" and "discriminatory enforcement" of the law. The prac-
tice of selective enforcement is generally recognized as legitimate in
light of the state's limited resources and the prosecutor's duty to cope
with the problem of public order and safety.93 Total enforcement of
96. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 10, at 379.
97. Id. at 4.
98. See note 43 supra. The ABA Standards state:
The prosecutor is not obligated to present all charges which the evidence
might support. The prosecutor may in some circumstances and for good cause
consistent with the public interest decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that
evidence may exist which would support a conviction.
ABA STANDARDS, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3.9 (1971).
The prosecutor may be guided by the following:
(1) his reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact guilty;
(2) extent of the harm caused by the offense;
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the law is neither attainable nor desirable. The courts have seldom
challenged this practice of prosecuting only a chosen few from among
those who have engaged in the same proscribed conduct.9 9 Only in the
infrequent cases where a defendant has been able to show intentional
discrimination based on an impermissible standard (e.g., race) have
the courts been willing to find that an individual's right to equal treat-
ment has been infringed by the state. 00 However, more recently the
judiciary has become increasingly receptive to a defendant's assertion
of this claim.110
The danger in allowing the prosecutor to exercise unbridled
discretion is that s/he may choose to pursue individuals that s/he
thinks should be convicted. Instead, s/he should be directing his or her
efforts at those cases which, for the community's well-being, ought to
be prosecuted. This potential for abuse is inherent in the discretionary
nature of the administrative processing of criminal defendants:
If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his cases, it follows that he
can choose his defendants.
. . . It is in this realm-in which the prosecutor picks some
person whom he dislikes or desires to embarrass, or selects some group
of unpopular persons and then looks for an offense, that the greatest
danger of abuse of prosecuting power lies. It is here that law enforce-
ment becomes personal, and the eal crime becomes that of being
(3) possible improper motive of a complainant;
(4) victim's reluctance to testify, etc.
Id. Legislative "overcriminalization" has also been suggested as supporting a prosecutor's
decision not to prosecute in certain instances. La Fave, supra note 43, at 533. In addition
see NATIONAL ADvIsoRY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS,
COURTS § 1.1 (Criteria for Screening) (1973) [hereinafter cited as COURTS]; TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS, supra note 44, at 5-8.
99. See Comment, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal
Laws, 61 COLUm. L. Rav. 1103, 1141 (1961).
100. The classic statement of this standard is found in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 357, 373-74 (1886). However, commentators have noted that since Yick Wo
the guidelines applied by courts to claims of discriminatory prosecution have been sketchy
at best. See Comment, 9 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS-Civ. LIB. L. REv. 372, 379-81 (1974). For
one to substantiate a claim of discriminatory prosecution, the "general rule" is that s/he
"must allege and prove what the prosecutor knew, what the prosecutor decided, and
why he decided it. The defendant must do this although he has in fact been treated
unequally vis-a-vis others who are also violating the law, and although the matters he
must prove are known only by the prosecutor." Givelber, supra note 43, at 95. Bad faith
prosecution (initiated to harass or to deter the exercise of a protected right) is recog-
nized as a clear abuse of authority. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479
(1965); Shaw v. Garrison, 467 F.2d 113 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972);
Dixon v. District of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
101. See, e.g., United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973) (non-possession
of Selective Service registration and classification cards); United States v. Steele, 461
F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972) (refusal to answer census questions); United States v.
Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972) (disorderly conduct at a demonstration).
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unpopular with the predominant or governing group or being attached
to the wrong political views .... 102
Support is growing for Professor Kenneth Davis' suggestion'0 3
that these adverse effects of prosecutorial discretion may be minimized
by structuring and raising the visibility of this decision-making
process.' 0 4 General guidelines should be formulated, put in writing
and publicized. In individual cases the rationale supporting a prose-
cutor's action should be made explicit and recorded.10 5 As Professor
Davis has recommended, the prosecutor's decisions should be subjected
to "a simple and general requirement of open findings, open reasons,
and open precedents, except when special reason for confidentiality
exists."10 6
PROMIS, however, is not designed to make the prosecutor's de-
cision-making more visible to defendants, the courts or the public.
Instead, its primary emphasis is on assuring hierarchical accountability
within the prosecutor's office. PROMIS aids in structuring prosecu-
torial discretion in two ways. First, as discussed earlier, PROMIS
generates case-ratings which are utilized in the assigning of office
personnel and resources to high-priority cases. Second, PROMIS re-
quires assistant district attorneys to record "reason data" on each dis-
missal. 0 7 This information is then readily accessible to the chief or
supervising prosecutor. The chief prosecutor can then use PROMIS as
a managerial aid to frame policy, monitor and enforce adherence to
that policy, and evaluate its effectiveness. According to the PROMIS
Briefing Series this capability meets the need
to hold subordinates accountable for adherence to policy governing
discretionary decision-making. Accountability results if the visibility
of such decisions is raised to the point where they can be monitored,
as when reasons are recorded in explanation of discretionary actions.10 8
The Briefing Series also claims that records of such "reason data"
better enable the chief prosecutor to assure the evenhanded adminis-
102. Jackson, supra note 42, at 19; LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION, supra note
4, at 290-91.
103. K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 43.
104. COURTS, supra note 98, at 3.
105. Id. The case for publication of prosecutorial policy is made in Abrams, In-
ternal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 U.C.L.A.L. RV.
25-28 (1971).
106. K. DAvis, supra note 43, at 190.
107. BRIEFING SERIES No. 8, REASONS FOp. DISCRETIONARY AND OTHER ACTIoNS 2
(1974). There is apparently no requirement that reason data be entered into PROMIS
at each stage that the prosecutor decides s/he should proceed with the case.
108. Id. at 3.
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tration of justice. It is important to recognize, however, that while these
records do facilitate administrative control over caseloads, they do not
necessarily promote either visibility or the equitable administration of
justice.
For instance, two assistant district attorneys each process identical
felony cases (the same legal charge and the same PROMIS case rating
for each). Subsequently, one defendant goes to trial on the felony
charge while the other is permitted to plead to a misdemeanor count.
By evaluating the reason data the chief prosecutor can determine the
soundness of each assistant's decision. If the reason is found to be in-
adequate, the assistant is so advised or office policy is reformulated.0 9
PROMIS' design thus assures that the supervising prosecutor's dis-
cretion is implemented rather than his subordinates'. It stresses the role
of the central supervising authority but does not embody safeguards
that will insure that the policies set by this authority are reasonable
and fair.
An additional benefit, according to the Briefing Series, lies in im-
proved internal administration from the prosecutor's use of reason
data to identify practices outside the office which might hinder his/her
effectiveness. For example, PROMIS might be used to identify those
police who consistently make arrests without probable cause."10 The
prosecutor could then bring these problems to the attention of the par-
ticular agency for appropriate corrective action.
These uses of PROMIS to guide the prosecutor's actions pose two
serious problems. First, it is possible that inappropriate or legally im-
permissible criteria will be applied in programming PROMIS to
select the "most important" cases for special attention, resulting in
discriminatory prosecutions. Second, there is the potential for decision-
making to become purely mechanistic.
PROMIS' case-rating criteria are strongly biased toward selecting
personal injury or property-loss crimes for special attention. Far from
being neutral, the PROMIS criteria contain a class bias. The PROMIS
system tends to select out street crime and crime committed by mem-
bers of lower economic classes over middle-class, white-collar crime.
It may in fact be more "economical" for the prosecutor to concentrate
resources on these highly visible street crimes because they may offer
the opportunity for a greater number of visible, successful prosecutions
at a lesser investment cost."' But this may be a faulty, self-serving
109. Id. at 4.
110. Id. at 6.
111. See R. POSNER, EcoNomic ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 10, at 382.
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economic choice. It ignores the long-run cost to the community from
losses due to the much more lucrative white-collar crime which would
receive considerably less of the prosecutor's attention and resources
under the current PROMIS standards.112
Precautions must also be taken to guard against another type of
abuse that often arises in the recording of personal information and
maintenance of data files. As computer information systems like
PROMIS proliferate throughout criminal justice institutions, it is
necessary that administrators charged with supervising the implementa-
tion of such systems remain sensitive to the problems of contextual
accuracy that will inevitably arise. Precautions mnust be taken to pro-
gram PROMIS with sufficient accuracy and specificity to assure that the
PROMIS-generated case-ratings accurately reflect the background and
status of a case. When data subjects identify either factual or contextual
inaccuracies, means must be readily accessible to redress these griev-
ances and to correct or clarify file-data so that mishandling or misclassi-
fication of data does not result in an unwarranted charge or prosecution.
If a "history of drug abuse" is relied on as a case-rating criterion,
PROMIS must be programmed to distinguish between "soft" drugs,
personal use of which may be only a civil violation, and "hard" drugs,
which may indicate some form of involvement with organized crime.
If case-delay is a factor that PROMIS is to balance in its formula,
safeguards must be developed to assure that assertion of pre-trial pro-
cedural remedies (e.g., preliminary, Wade or suppression hearings) does
not become a basis for subjecting an individual to especially aggressive
prosecution. In the interests of speed and efficiency, and in the absence
of appropriate checks, PROMIS might be utilized, consciously or not,
as an instrument for discouraging assertion of these constitutionally
guaranteed procedural safeguards.
Of immediate concern is PROMIS reliance on arrest records
in its evaluative process. Unexplained and incomplete arrest records,
disseminated throughout the nation via computer networks, are some
of the most dangerous types of personal information in our society.113
112. Applying these criteria to cases prosecuted in the Washington, D.C. Superior
Court would be appropriate since this court concentrates on adjudicating street crime
cases. However, in jurisdictions not so organized, the PROMIS bias toward isolating
street crime could divert the prosecutor's attention from important areas that deserve
scrutiny.
113. See Miller, The Right of Privacy: Data Banks and Dossiers, in FINAL REPORT
OF THE ANNUAL CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADVOCAOY IN THE
UNITED STATES 72, 76-77 (1974). See generally A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY
47 et seq. (1971).
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A very large percentage of arrest records exchanged by the various
police agencies show no disposition of the charge following arrest.
Nor apparently does PROMIS differentiate between arrests that ulti-
mately resulted in a "nolle prosequi," a finding of innocence or
reversal of conviction on appeal from those arrests that led to con-
viction. 114 This practice can lead to the prosecutor perpetuating
harassment, begun by the police, of groups such as gays or political
activists who may often be arrested by the police but seldom convicted.
In a nation that is supposed to be committed to the proposition that
one is innocent until conclusively proven guilty, PROMIS' reliance
on incomplete arrest records as a basis for identifying cases worthy of
aggressive prosecution is unwarranted.
Perhaps the greatest potential for abuse lies in the prosecutor's
power to combine information garnered from intelligence systems
with his agency's regular information files.115 These intelligence systems,
developed largely with LEAA grants, store primarily data on organ-,
ized crime, civil disorders and political dissenters.". 6 It is possible for a
prosecutor to develop his own intelligence files or to gain access to
similar files maintained by other agencies, particularly records that
identify a subject as a social activist or political extremist of either
fringe."17 The prosecutor could then use this information in conjunc-
tion with PROMIS to identify individuals vulnerable to or "deserv-
ing of" prosecution. If such practices were shown to exist a clear case
of abuse of discretion could be substantiated. 118
114. It has already been noted that efforts are apparently underway to incorporate
conviction data into PROMIS. See note 75 supra.
115. See HEW, RncoRDs, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF
THE SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS 223
(1973) [hereinafter cited as HEW REPORT).
116. Id. In addition, see Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972), where the issue was
the potential "chilling effect" on first amendment rights engendered by the Army's sur-
veillance of "lawful and peaceful civilian political activity."
117. Recent disclosures of "enemies lists" and files on potentially "vulnerable"
political dissidents, legislators and other public and private officials, maintained by the
White House, the CIA, FBI and Departments of State and Defense, attest to the broad-
ening scope of this problem. See Amsterdam, The One-Sided Sword: Selective Prosecu-
tion in Federal Courts, 6 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 1, 2 (1974).
118. See, e.g., Lenske v. United States, 383 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1967), in which
Judge Madden (concurring) expressed dismay over the pursuit of Lenske by a revenue
agent, for the purpose of establishing a tax fraud charge because the agent thought
Lenske was a communist. Apparently prosecuting a suspected dangerous criminal for a
petty crime is considered to be a proper basis for selectivity. United States v. Sacco, 428
F.2d 264 (9th Cir. 1970) (suspected organized crime figure convicted of violating alien
registration laws). In this same vein, the prosecutor has been allowed to charge a sus-
pected criminal with any petty crime s/he has committed, even though most people would
not be prosecuted for the same offense. The defendant must be suspected of having com-
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However, it would be difficult to substantiate this abuse given
PROMIS' current lack of visibility to the public. Unfortunately, it is
usually the technologically unsophisticated defendant who feels that
s/he may be the object of a discriminatory prosecution. S/he must con-
front a mechanistic system whose computer software and impersonal
operations mask the policies and values that guide decision-making.
While the dangers remain the same as those recognized by Justice
Jackson,"a9 the "personal" discretionary element appears to have been
removed. It is extremely difficult to attribute intent or purposefulness
to a machine. The fact that a programmer stands behind the computer
and its print-outs is too easily and too often obscured. Those people
who are in the best position to evaluate the program's intent-the
programmers and managerial staff-are the least inclined to expose
its subjective biases and decision-making chain. They have a vested
interest in its continued operation. Those who might wish or are re-
quired to challenge it (defendant, defendant's attorney, judges) are
too often at a tremendous technological disadvantage.
These prospects strongly reinforce the need to make prosecutorial
decision criteria more visible. PROMIS presently focuses on making
the rationales for staff decisions apparent to supervisors. But it is not
a sufficient check on discretion to place responsibility for scrutinizing
prosecutors' activities soley in the hands of the chief prosecutor.
PROMIS must be designed and operated to facilitate access to its
policy data by appropriate outsiders as well. Evaluation and criticism
by outside sources could lead to revisions and improvements within
the prosecutor's office. Defense attorneys would be better able to coun-
sel clients and to negotiate on an even basis with prosecutors. Courts
would be able to knowledgeably adjudicate an accused's allegations
of discriminatory treatment by prosecutors.1 20
mitted other crimes rather than of engaging in unpopular legal activities. Cox v. Louisi-
ana, 379 U.S. 536, 557-58 (1965).
Further militating against one's successfully establishing a claim of discrimination is
the rule that if the prosecutor can demonstrate a "not insignificant" degree of enforce-
ment, the claim of discrimination will fail. Rhinehart v. Rhay, 440 F.2d 718 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 825 (1971). Defendant, charged with sodomy, offered to prove
his claim of discriminatory prosecution with affidavits attesting to the tolerance by police
of homosexual activity that regularly occurred in the city of his arrest. His offer of
proof was denied when it was demonstrated that numerous prosecutions for sodomy were
initiated before and after his prosecution. Id. at 727. This type of rule would have seri-
ous implications for someone who is arrested on a minor charge which would otherwise
be treated in run-of-the-mill fashion, until the cross-indexing of an intelligence file with
PROMIS indicates this person to be a political dissident. If PROMIS were so pro-
grammed, it might then direct that this person deserved special prosecutorial attention.
119. See note 42 supra.
120. See Abrams, supra note 105.
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With the proper guidelines and supervision, the computer can
be instrumental in achieving the objectives of "open findings, open
reasons and open precedents." With minimal effort, data can be quickly
retrieved and made available to litigants and judges. By directing that
appropriate statistical techniques be applied to the data base the courts
can evaluate the legitimacy of "selective" prosecutions. Policies ad-
vocated by the community or mandated by courts and legislatures
can be programmed into the computer memory and their implementa-
tion effectively monitored.
But there are important pitfalls associated with computer-gene-
rated data that must be avoided. The computer has the ability to
package erroneous or misleading data into an extremely persuasive
format. It is often difficult to look behind that package. As has been
frequently noted, those who lack the technical expertise to undertake
an adequate analysis of the data's validity may be subject to a sub-
conscious bias that computer generated data is inherently correct.121
To minimize these problems, the prosecutor should be required
to provide, under appropriate circumstances, a careful analysis, from
information source, through each stage of processing, to the final data
output by PROMIS. More specifically, this would entail a demonstra-
tion of the following:
(1) that steps were taken to detect and reduce error at the data
collection stages;
(2) the source of the underlying data;
(3) that errors were not introducted at later stages of processing,
especially via an erroneous program that might cause data to
be lost, transformed or incompletely retrieved;
(4) that the programs do in fact perform the functions that they
are supposed to do at each point that the data are manipulated;
(5) that the computer has displayed the results accurately and
in an unbiased format. 22
While these requirements may prove burdensome to the prosecutor,
they are necessary if computer-guided discretion is to be effectively
contained.
121. See Roberts, A Practitioner's Primer on Computer-Generated Evidence, 41
U. CHI. L. REv. 254, 274 (1974).
122. These guidelines have been adapted from those recommended to regulate the
use of computer-generated evidence. See id. at 263-72.
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PROMIS is still in the nascent stage. As its case-evaluation tech-
niques become more sophisticated, the risk increases that decision-
making will become purely mechanical. 123 Basing decisions exclusively
on computer feedback can have a limiting effect that must be avoided.
People and machines simply do not think alike. Computers rely heav-
ily on quantitative methodologies while human thought processes are
not so easily defined. Much can be lost when people attempt to force
their human, intuitive thought structures into mathematical modes.
PROMIS may cope quite adequately with well-defined, quantified in-
puts. But it is not at all certain that PROMIS is capable of dealing
with the myriad subtleties contained in the inquiry of "whether the
prosecution in the long run would do more harm than good."'124
Threats to personal privacy are also inherent in the spread of
"integrated information systems" such as PROMIS, TRACE, NCIC,
SEARCH 25 and New York State's Identification and Intelligence Sys-
tem. 12 6 NCIC is already the core of an elaborate crime-information net-
work that will eventually integrate and coordinate law enforcement
information centers throughout the nation into a single system.127 On
a smaller scale such an integrated system, incorporating PROMIS, al-
ready exists in Washington, D.C.' 28 The trap that these interconnected
systems can create for an individual has been widely documented:
The new criminal justice information network can be used in
conjunction with the vast government and private computer dos-
siers being compiled by credit bureaus, insurance companies, wel-
fare agencies, mental health units and others. Cumulatively, these
files threaten an "information tyranny" that could lock each citizen
into his past; they signal the end of a uniquely American promise-
that the individual can shed past mistakes and entanglements, and
start out anew.
29
As PROMIS is adopted elsewhere, 130 it is imperative that these con-
cerns be addressed at the design and implementation stage. Appro-
123. This risk is emphatically denied by PROMIS' promoters who claim that the
case-rating procedure "permits prosecutive judgment to conform more closely to the
specific facts surrounding the defendant and his or her crime than would otherwise be
possible." BRIEFING SFRIEs No. 3 at 3.
124. Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 174,
193 (1965).
125. See HEW REPORT, supra note 115, at 227-36.
126. See generally A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 162-67 (1971); A.
WESTIN & M. BAKER, DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY 47-64, 311-15 (1972).
127. HEW REPORT at 225-39.
128. See note 92 supra.
129. HEW REPORT at 224-25.
130. PROMIS has been or is being installed in the following locations: Los An-
geles County (in three field offices as a prototype), Rhode Island Attorney General's
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priate safeguards must be devised and explicit regulations promulgated
to assure that privacy invasion is minimized.131 It is only too typical that
privacy considerations are the last to receive attention. 32 Without
adequate controls these information systems will continue to expand,
driven by their own momentum.133
The courts have generally looked favorably on law enforcement
information gathering and sharing practices as essential to crime de-
tection and prevention. 34 But as automated criminal information sys-
tems expand, they incorporate growing volumes of sensitive informa-
tion about people who are neither fugitives nor suspects. Precautions
to insure the security and integrity of these files are lax at best and
often nonexistent. The dangers posed by these systems may already out-
weigh any benefits.135
Finally, the courts must face the possibility that a prosecutor, sup-
ported by the PROMIS computer capabilities, may come to exercise
office, New Orleans, Wayne County (Detroit) and the Manhattan district attorney's of-
fice. Telephone interview with William A. Hamilton, President, Institute for Law & So-
cial Research, April 29, 1975.
131. Various legislative efforts have been directed at regulating the collection and
dissemination of criminal justice information. See, e.g., Iowa Criminal History and In-
telligence Disclosure Act, 1973, IowA CODE ANN. § 749 B. (West Supp. 1975); Mass.
Criminal Offender Record Information System Act, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, §§ 167-178
(West Supp. 1975); An Act Relating to the Collection, Security and Dissemination of
Records and Information by the State and Its Political Subdivisions, MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 15.162-15.168 (West Supp. 1975); Berkeley, Cal., Ordinance No. 4732 (1974) (re-
quiring a social impact statement before funds can be allocated or expended for imple-
mentation of or significant change in any automated city personal data system).
132. See BRIEFING SERIES No. 18, PRIVACY AND SECURITY (forthcoming).
133. Dr. Ida Hoos, an outspoken critic of management information systems sug-
gests that there are very active forces behind the information explosion. The intertwining
of technology and Madison Avenue has made information handling and related man-
agement science techniques valuable commodities:
[O]versell dominates every stage of the system analysis from proposal to final
report. The "expert" appears in many forms . . . but always as a salesman in
disguise. He testifies at Congressional hearings; he delivers keynote addresses at
meetings of all kinds of professional groups. His presence at the latter is
strictly that of the fox in the henhouse, for he invariably predicts growing
complexity ahead and promulgates the notion that nothing short of the power-
ful tools of his technology will suffice to handle the problems. . . . The name
of the game is self-perpetuation, the stakes are high, for systems business is
booming, here and abroad.
Hoos, Systems Experts: Foxes in the Henhouse, in INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN A
DEMOCRACY 444, 448-49 (A. Westin ed. 1971). In addition, see I. Hoos, SYSTEMS ANA-
LYSIS IN PUBLIC POLICY (1972); I. Hoos, SYSTEMS ANALYSIS IN SOCIAL POLICY
(1969); Hoos, Can Systems Analysis Solve Social Problems?, 20 DATAmATION 82
(1974).
134. See, e.g., Anderson v. Sills, 56 N.J. 210, 265 A.2d 678 (1970). The court did
recognize that judicial intervention, limited to offending material or practices, might be
warranted if information is being gathered which the police "could not reasonably be-
lieve to be relevant to the police function . .. ." 265 A.2d at 689.
135. See A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY, supra note 92, at 163.
1975]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25
inordinate and unwarranted control over the entire criminal justice
process. The prosecutor, equipped with such a sophisticated managerial
tool may come, whether intentionally or not, to direct the court's ac-
tivities. However, since the courts are responsible for supervising the
prosecutor, as well as many of the other criminal justice agencies with
which the prosecutor interacts, PROMIS creates pressure on the courts
to respond if they are to avoid being dominated by the prosecutor.
In sheer self-defense courts not already equipped with such capabili-
ties may be forced to give serious consideration to adopting computer
information techniques and related management science tools.
IV. THE COURTS AND COMPUTERIZATION
There is an extensive literature describing and advocating com-
puter applications to streamline criminal court administration.180 While
use of electronic computers is economically viable in only about 300 of
the largest jurisdictions, these jurisdictions tend to include metropoli-
tan courts where criminal caseloads are burgeoning and the greatest
court delay is found.137
Many of the uses of data automation as an aid in the day-to-day
operation of the courts parallel those described in the preceding section
on PROMIS. Those computer applications most relevant to the judi-
ciary include: 18
(1) compliation of automated data files, which contain identify-
ing and administrative information for each case;
(2) statistical analysis of the judicial caseload, used to identify
reasons for case continuances and other causes for delay;
(3) automated random selection of jurors, printing of subpoenas
and making of jury assignments, in the hope of eliminating
excessive juror waiting time; 1
136. See, e.g., E. ADAMS, COURTS AND COMPUTERS (1972); Adams, The Move
Toward Modern Data Management in the Courts, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 250 (1971); Hal-
loran, Modernized Court Administration, in TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS, supra
note 44, at 162; McKee, Computers and the Courts-Recommendations Made to the
Courts Task Force, 3 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & L. 134 (1973); Polansky, Contempo-
rary Automation in the Courts, 6 LAvw & COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 122 (no. 6) (1973);
Symposium, Courts of Tomorrow, 12 JUiuETRiCS J. 195 (1972). A sampling of articles
from JUDICATURE, the Journal of the American Judicature Society include: Blaine, Com-
puter-Based Information Systems Can Help Solve Urban Court Problems, 54 JUDICA-
TURE 149 (1970); Kleps, Computers and Court Management, 53 JUDICATURE 322
(1970); Winters, Innovations in Court Administration, 55 JUDICATURE 194 (1971).
137. TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS, supra note 44, at 89-90.
138. Polansky, Contemporary Automation in the Courts, supra note 136, at 123-27.
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(4) print-outs of attorney "inventory" reports that make it pos-
sible for the court to evaluate the quantity and age of the
pending cases for every attorney and thus enable the court
to identify those counsel who are "overloaded" and to "act
accordingly;' 39
(5) case scheduling: while the greatest theoretical advantage to be
gained from computer applications would be the use of auto-
mated scheduling to provide maximum coordination and uti-
lization of all parties, resources and facilities, to date no juris-
diction has been able to implement an automated schedule.
While such computer applications are operative in a limited num-
ber of jurisdictions, 140 impediments to implementation of automated
systems have yet to be overcome in many others:
139. Id. at 125. The problems that may be encountered if/when such computer-
generated "attorney lists" become prevalent were highlighted by an anecdote related
by Judge Leon Higgenbotham:
We went over the data [computer printouts on attorney performance] and found
some lawyers just had too many cases . . .so the Chief Judge wrote a letter
to the parties and said:
"It appears to me that if you have more than five cases within the first
550 on the trial list, you should consider voluntarily reassigning them. If you
will not voluntarily reassign it, please be in court on Friday to give me ...
the name and address of your client .... ." [A]nd because of the Chief Judge's
unusual persuasiveness, when we walked into Court that Friday morning we
found literally that hundreds of cases had been reassigned.
Higgenbotham, The Trial Backlog and Computer Analysis, 44 F.R.D. 104, 109 (1967).
While court regulation of attorney case backlogs may be necessary on occasion,
judicial intimidation of this nature is unwarranted, especially since there were apparently
no rules promulgated by the court to structure the Chief Judge's discretionary actions.
Such judicial acts raise important constitutional questions regarding both the right of
a criminal defendant to counsel of his own choice and the lawyer's right to pursue his
profession. Cf. Moore v. Jamieson, 451 Pa. 299, 306 A.2d 283 (1973), where the court
found a court rule requiring an attorney, who was counsel in ten or more criminal cases
over a year old, to forego taking additional criminal clients, to be vague and overbroad.
The court recognized that the state, in the interests of the swift and efficient adminis-
tration of criminal justice, could exercise certain regulatory authority over attorneys. But
it found that the rule adopted failed to provide either a standard by which responsi-
bility for the delay could be assigned or a procedure for resolving disputes between at-
torneys and the supervising court.
140. Philadelphia, which has had a fully operational computer information system
since 1968, is one of the jurisdictions that has apparently experienced success in auto-
mating its casel6ad. The Philadelphia court has a pioneering on-line case-monitoring sys-
tem which tracks current cases, assigns priorities and analyzes attorney caseloads. For
a description of the Philadelphia operation see Blake & Polansky, Computer Streamlines
Caseload at Philadelphia Common Pleas Court, 53 JUDICATURE 205 (1969). A survey
of those jurisdictions where computerization is operative can be found in Polansky,
Contemporary Automation in the Courts, supra note 136.
For a largely theoretical discussion of another computer-based management informa-
tion system see Ebersole & Hall, COURTRAN: A Modular Management Information
and Research System for the Judicial Process, 3 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & L. 83 (1973).
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The few experts in court procedure and automation... generally
give poor report cards to edp and management consultants .... The
archaic courts know nothing of computers. The quill is their tool, and
they are run by judges, clerks, and prosecutors, acting as part-time
administrators.
.I]t's.. . folly to automate an inefficient system.'141
To remedy these organization deficiencies, Chief Justice Warren
Burger has urged that the courts need management that overworked
judges simply cannot provide: "We need a corps of trained adminis-
trators or managers ... to manage and direct the machinery so that
judges can concentrate on their primary professional duty of judg-
ing."'42 In response to such attitudes there has been a proliferation of
management and administrative specialists in judicial operations. The
purpose of this influx of court administrators is to aid the judiciary by
collecting judicial statistics, managing fiscal affairs, supervising court
personnel and coordinating the assignment of judges and the schedul-
ing of cases.143
COURTRAN is described as a "modular software system designed by the staff of the
Federal Judicial Center . . .to provide information support services for court manage-
ment and for study and evaluation of court procedures and processes." Id. at 84. The
"modular" concept involves development of many small, component programs (called
"functional modules"), each of which has a specific function. Modules can then be com-
bined to create different systems, enabling one to manipulate one or two modules with-
out the need to reprogram an entire subsystem. The use of a "transition matrix struc-
ture" for defining the developments in the life of a case is described as the most unique
characteristic of COURTRAN. A transition matrix is a technique for symbolically rep-
resenting case events and stages and can be viewed as a simplified flow-charting tech-
nique, whereby a case may be followed from entrance into the judicial system to its
eventual exit. Id. at 92.
141. Pantages, No Glory in Chaos, 12 JussmFTmcs J. 193-94 (1972).
142. Burger, Court Administrators-Where Would We Find Them, 53 JUDICA-
TURE 108 (1969); CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 1, at 380-81.
The presuppositions of the management perspective have been outlined by Professor
David Saari: "A court with impaired management produces an inferior brand of jus-
tice.... [J]udges operating in an efficient, professionally-sensitive and well-managed en-
vironment will be relieved of major management distractions and will be afforded a
maximum opportunity to devote their total professional focus to the task of adjudication."
Saari, Management and Courts: A Perplexing Nexus, 20 Amx. U.L. Rav. 601, 604
(1971).
143. See generally Saari, Court Management and the Administration of Justice, in
LAW AND ORDER RECONSIDERED, supra note 3, at 554-73; D. SAARI, MODERN COURT
MANAGEMENT: TRENDS IN THE ROLE OF THE COURT EXECUTIVE (1970); Tydings,
Modernizing the Administration of Justice, 50 JUDICATURE 258 (1967).
The Institute for Court Management in Denver, Colorado was founded in 1970. The
Institute is sponsored jointly by the Institute of Judicial Administration at New York
University, the American Bar Association and the American Judicature Society. Its pur-
pose is to develop sophisticated court management procedures and to train professional
court executives with managerial expertise. See Saari, supra note 142, at 602.
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But even if management of judicial institutions is supervised by
those with legal training (lawyers who become managers or judges
who become assignment or administrative judges) as foreseen by some,144
there is a risk that the courts may abdicate their supervisory and policy-
making functions to a staff of managerial technicians. To avoid the
specter of judicial institutions entrusted to a technological elite, it is
incumbent upon those charged with adjudicating to consciously guard
against being mystified by the technical expertise and jargon of these
management specialists. It is their responsibility to articulate and
enforce the limits of the managerial role:
[Court] management is not a universal panacea for all the non-judicial
problems of a court. It is not a job exclusively for efficiency experts
whose only values are increased speed, increased production, lower
costs, and less waste.... Improved court management will see delega-
tion of the details of management to someone other than the judge,
but the important matters of administrative policy as well as judicial
policy must be established by the judge.145
Those enthralled by the computer's technological capabilities may come
to believe that computers and the technical staff that programs and
operates them are themselves responsible for reducing the judicial
backlog. Judges who rely on such techniques, however, must continu-
ously make certain that the technicians and their machines remain
merely advisory to the judicial ffinction. A judge with access to auto-
matic data processing facilities may be better able to discern the roots
of problems causing systemic congestion and delay in his court. But it is
the judge's decisions based on such knowledge, not the technology it-
self, that will alleviate the backlog.146
However, the admittedly very real problems of court congestion
must not be permitted to obscure other more important issues facing
the criminal courts.' 4 7 As a critic of the "congestion syndrome" has
144. See Saari, supra note 142, at 607. Because of the high level of technical ex-
pertise in the fields of management science, quantitative methods and computer soft-
ware required of those in court manager positions, it is not at all certain that the transi-
tion from lawyer or judge to manager can be easily made.
145. LAW AND ORDER RECONSIDERED, supra note 3, at 556.
146. See E. ADAMS, COURTS AND COMPUTERS 126-27 (1972). Martin Mayer has
pointed out a drawback that may be encountered should a court administrator become
too influential: "[E]veryone wishes to maintain the independence of judges and any
judge under tight administrative control is in a position to be punished." M. MAYER,
THE LAWYERS 434 (1967).
147. See, e.g., Comisky, Slow Justice Is Preferable to Speedy Injustice, 44- PA. B.
AsS'N Q. 23 (1972); Foster, The Right to a Slow Trial: Insuring Effective Counsel,
2 Ais. J. CRim. L. 67 (1973).
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observed: "[T]he deeper we probe into the problem of efficiency in
court processes, the more apparent it becomes that the vital problem is
the quality, not the speed, of the process."' 148 Nor is it clear that speed
and size of the backlog are the best criteria for evaluating a court's
performance and effectiveness. The measure of a court's effectiveness
depends on what is considered to be the most important function of
courts in a democratic society. As Judge David Bazelon has observed,
our courts are charged with tasks that are considerably more complex
than that of routinely processing the accused from arraignment through
final disposition:
[C]ourts in the criminal process serve functions far more important
than simply clearing people off the streets, no matter how well or
accurately they do that job. No matter how much we expand ourjudicial resources, the courts cannot be the primary agency we rely
upon to solve our problems. Other institutions, better adapted to broad-
scale programs and more institutionally responsive to changing condi-
tions, must handle thos6 jobs. But what the courts can do is take the
time necessary to see to it that the other institutions are in fact doing
what they are supposed to do.
...But these functions take substantial time. Efficiency is nice,
but it's really beside the point. The true measure of the quality of a
judicial system is how many hidden problems it brings into public
view and how well it stimulates the responsible officials and agencies
into doing something about these problems."49
Two considerations relevant to PROMIS should also be noted in
connection with automated judicial information systems. The first is
the manager's perennial quest for the Total Justice Information Sys-
148. Rosenberg, Court Congestion: Status, Causes, and Proposed Remedies, in Tun
COURTS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 29, 57 (H. Jones ed. 1965).
149. Bazelon, supra note 35, at 654-55, 660 (emphasis added). Judge Bazelon has
provided a succinct summary of the relationship of efficiency to adjudicatory processes:
The judicial process is at its core a fundamentally inefficient process. This
must be so, for inevitably problems that are brought before the courts are the
problems that no other social institution has solved. The courts themselves,
of course, cannot solve these problems. What they can do, however, is take
a close look indeed at the situation before them, to bring out factors that have
previously remained hidden and to insure that the responsible agencies are
making a genuine effort to deal with the problems instead of simply acting out
of ignorance, fear or prejudice.
• . .The judicial process is a social institution designed to guarantee that
this probing will be done. We strike at its very reason for being if we seek
to eliminate this aspect of the judicial function as a sacrifice on the altar of




tern (TJIS). The judicial system manager desires that as much perti-
nent criminal justice information as possible be collected and main-
tained centrally: "TJIS offers the only possible answer to criminal
justice information needs.., the only way to avoid replication of data
and resources; and. . . the key to complete and consistent data in all
agencies."' 50 Courts adopting management information systems to
speed their administrative and adjudicative processes would be well-ad-
vised to reflect on the implications of this scenario described by Dr.
Ida Hoos:
Gargantuan [information] systems that, with the ingestive propensi-
ties of snakes, have subverted and swallowed up the very organiza-
tions they were purported to serve are the outcome of a chain of ap-
parently innocuous circumstances. Electronic data processing intro-
duced in the mid 1950s to hasten the paper flow, reduce clerical costs,
and increase efficiency in information handling was the first step.
The logic was clear, economic justification unassailable ....
But two decades and two computer generations later the prom-
ises are still illusory. To be sure, records move faster, but their volume
has increased exponentially. In Parkinsonian fashion, they have ex-
panded to fill all computer time.' 51
The courts should strive to resist the metamorphosis from adjudica-
tory institution to information compiler and processor. Such a meta-
morphosis will not improve the quality of justice, but will more likely
encumber the judicial machinery with bureaucratic features deplored
in other government agencies.
The second problem inheres in the almost infectious tendency of
computer information processing techniques to make their impact
felt in systems and agencies contiguous to those in which such technolo-
gies are operative. As courts come to rely on attorney lists and related
applications to monitor lawyers' caseloads and to regulate their activi-
ties, attorneys may themselves be compelled to implement computer
techniques. 52 Agencies that use this technology will be most amenable
150. Polansky, supra note 136, at 134-35. See generally CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN
A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 1, at 598-606; TASI FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECH-
NOLOGY, supra note 8, at 68-79; Lejins, National Crime Data Reporting System: Proposalfor a Model, in TAsy, FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN AssESSMENT 178
(1967); Criminal Statistics-An Urgently Needed Resource, in id. at 123.
151. Hoos, Can Systems Analysis Solve Social Problems?, 20 DATAMATION 82, 83
(1974).
152. One lawyer familiar with such automated techniques has advised that:
Lawyers should explore the feasibility of setting up systems that will keep them
abreast of the work of their offices and that will bring to light particular situa-
tions that they can expect the courts to be critical of. In doing this work, they
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to other agencies already employing management science techniques
and computerization. Whether or not s/he favors the approach, the
lawyer will be faced with procedures, evaluative methodologies and
language which will require at least a familiarity with the systems
approach.
V. JUSSIM: USING COMPUTERS TO ANALYZE THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM
"Systems" practitioners active in the areas of criminal justice plan-
ning and policy formulation have developed computer techniques for
analyzing systemic dysfunctions. These analysts start from the data base
that has been generated by the prosecutors' and courts' management
information systems already described. Applying certain management
science techniques, including systems analysis and operations research,
they have constructed models of the criminal justice processes."' These
models, or "simulations," are then used to pretest and explore the
possible consequences of alternative policy and program actions. The
following discussion will focus on one such model, JUSSIM. This
model has been described by its originator, Professor Alfred Blum-
stein, as an interactive computer program that "is intended to permit
criminal justice system managers and planners to test the downstream
must give serious consideration to the possibility of using computer techniques
as well as other techniques made available through management science.
Freed, The Trial Backlog and Computer Analysis, 44 F.R.D. 113, 115 (1967). See gen-
erally Toward Structuring the Law Office: Designs for Efficiency, TRIAL, Sept./Oct.,
1974, at 10-72.
153. As Professor Alan Westin has recognized, the mutually reinforcing nature of
computerized information systems and management science techniques is hardly for-
tuitous:
[O]omputerized databanks and management science techniques.. . are usually
interlocking phenomena .... [E]ach "route" tends to lead into the other. Crea-
tion of a computerized databank usually requires development of a "systems ap-
proach" to conceptualize the area and operations on which data are to be more
"systematically" collected. Once the data from a computerized reporting system
begin to flow in, there is a natural tendency to utilize these expensive and
voluminous outputs to achieve the supposed benefits of simulation, operations
research, program budgeting, and related management science techniques.
Similarly, the adoption of systems analysis; operations research, and pro-
gram budgeting by government agencies often creates heavy demands for "bet-
ter data"-more of it, and more regularly gathered, collated, processed, and
distributed.... [I]f the agency is heavily committed to management science ap-
proaches, it is almost inevitable that some kind of computerized databank will
be called for, if budgets permit. Thus the two "routes" toward technological
information systems tend to be mutually stimulating.




resource and cost implications associated with contemplated changes
within their CJS."' 54 JUSSIM will be used to demonstrate how the uses
of management information systems, with their stores of data collected
and generated in the course of daily operations, have been extended to
policy formulation and planning. More specifically, this discussion will
focus on the implications of using a formal model such as JUSSIM to
guide decision-making that will structure the future development of
our criminal justice institutions.
As a preface to this discussion, it may prove useful to explicate
some of the methodology and assumptions of the management science
techniques of systems analysis, operations research and simulation that
have been applied in modelling the administration of criminal justice.
Systems analysis has been described in broad terms as "an approach
to complex problems of choice under uncertainty by systematically
examining the costs, effectiveness, and risks of the various alterna-
tives."' 55 This method directs that the practitioner proceed according
to a plan in a rational and explicit way, from conception to opera-
tion. 56 It also directs that those individual operations under scrutiny
be considered in relation to the total system being studied: a "global"
or "system" view is to be kept in mind while details are manipulated. 57
Because of the rather loosely specified techniques that it prescribes for
coping with complex problems, systems analysis has been described as
"still largely a form of art.' 158
It is generally recognized that there is no clear line of demarca-
154. Blumnstein, Systems Analysis of Crime Control and the Criminal Justice Sys-
tem, in SYSTEMS APPROACH AND THE CITY 253, 259 (M. Mesarovic & A. Reisman eds.
1972).
155. Quade, Military Systems Analysis, (RA-3452-PR, Santa Monica, California:
The RAND Corporation, 1963), as quoted in G. STEINER, Top MANAGEMENT PLAN-
NING 393 (1969).
156. While there is no prescribed formula applicable to all cases, there are certain
characteristics that tend to distinguish systems analysis from other approaches to com-
plex problem solving. These include: (1) an eclectic, multi-disciplined perspective,
drawing on judgment, intuition and expert knowledge; (2) application of the scientific
method; (3) modeling; (4) application of cost/benefit analysis. G. STEINER, supra note
155, at 394-96. See also Wildavsky, The Political Economy of Efficiency: Cost-Benefit
Analysis, Systems Analysis, and Program Budgeting, in POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC
POLICY 55-82 (A. Ranney ed. 1968).
157. For a discussion of the phenomenon of every system being embedded in a
larger system, see C. CHURCHMAN, THE SYSTEMS APPROACH (1968).
158. E. QuADE, ANALYSIS FOR MILITARY DECISIONS 153 (1964). Dr. Ida Hoos
has described systems analysis as "a direct lineal descendent of World War II opera-
tions research. OR was used to solve tactical and strategic problems of a military nature;
systems analysis uses the same principles but has wider range and scope." Hoos, Sys-
tems Experts: Foxes in the Henhouse, supra note 133, at 445. While systems analysis
uses calculation and quantitative methods, it generally places considerably less emphasis
on them than does operations research.
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tion between systems analysis and "operations research" (O.R.).' 50 How-
ever, operations research techniques are usually reserved for the solu-
tion of limited, well-defined problems in which all the relevant rela-
tionships can be specified and quantified. 10 Beginning with specified
objectives, the operations researcher then attempts to do an "optimiza-
tion," that is s/he maximizes or minimizes some objective function,
given the available resources.' 6 O.R. is thus heavily dependent on the
set of mathematical techniques appropriate to this end and the com-
puter's high-speed, accuracy and computational capacities.10 2
The essence of the methodology of these related approaches (OR
and SA) lies in the construction of a model appropriate to the prob-
lem. A model, or simulation, is usually the starting point in systems
analysts' and operations researchers' attempts to discern order in the
seemingly undirected, uncoordinated forces and relationships that char-
acterize organizational problems. The model is often in the form of a
computer program that "introduces a precise structure and terminol-
ogy that serves primarily as an effective means of communication, and
through feedback.. . helps the experts to arrive at a clearer understand-
ing of the subject matter and the problem."'1 3 A likeness is developed
from a simplified abstraction of the real system. The likeness takes the
form of a dynamic model based on the simulator's concept of the key
elements of the system, their operation and interaction.'"
159. Confusing and often interchangeable terminology gluts the systems field:
We now have Operations Research, Management Science, Decision Science,
Cost-Benefit Analysis, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis; Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting; Optimal Allocation; Decision and Control; and finally, Systems
Analysis. . . . [A]n attempt to straighten out these labels [p]robably . . .
would only cause further proliferation of names and hence further confusion.
H. RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS 295 (1968).
160. See generally F. HILLIER & G. LIEBERMAN, INTRODUCTION TO OPERATIONS
RESEARCH (1967); E. QUADE, supra note 158, at 2-12; Wagner, The ABC's of OR,
19 OPERATIONS RESEARCH 1259 (1971).
161. Enthoven, Systems Analysis and the Navy, in A MODERN DESIGN FOR Dn-
FENSE DECISION; A MCNAmARA-HITcH-ENTHOVEN ANTHOLOGY 177-80 (S. Tucker ed.
1966), as contained in G. STEINER, supra note 155, at 400-02.
162. These mathematical techniques include linear programming, queuing theory,
search theory and inventory theory. The mathematical orientation of O.R. is so domi-
nant that it has been remarked that O.R. is most appropriately applied to problems
"in which mathematics can be thought of as a substitute for rather than as an aid to
judgment." G. STEINER, supra note 155, at 401.
163. B. QuADE, supra note 158, at 153. See generally T. NAYLOR, J. BALINTIY,
D. BURDICI. & K. CHU, COMPUTER SIMULATION TECHNIQUES 1-42 (1966); J. RASER,
SIMULATION AND SOCIETY (1969).
164. See Greenberger, A New Methodology for Computer Simulation, in CoM-
PUTER METHODS IN THE ANALYSIS OF LARGE-SCALE SOCIAL SYSTEMS 147-48 (J.
Beshers ed. 1964); Comment, Computer Simulation and Gaming: An Interdisciplinary
Survey with a View Toward Legal Applications, 24 STAN. L. REV. 712, 714-15 (1972).
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A computer simulation can be easily modified and manipulated
while the real world system often cannot. Dynamic, time-varying quali-
ties can be built into the computer model. This enables one to simu-
late in a matter of minutes real world activities that would normally
occur over many years. This allows for repeated trial-and-error experi-
mentation with various control variables.165
It must be remembered that a computer simulation is only a formal
structure that is taken into the laboratory:
[A] simulation model is not reality and should not be expected to
mirror it. Inevitably, the model will include some simplifying assump-
tions that are at variance with reality.166
The best that a simulation can offer is the opportunity to explore the
consequences of that formal structure.167 If the results of the simulation
foster confidence in the model's validity, then the referent elements
and relationships in the real world can be examined to determine
whether they are in fact as crucial as they appear in the model. Because
simulations are built from identifiable patterns and regularities identi-
fied in the real world systems being replicated, areas such as law, where
patterns, if existent, are often difficult to define,168 may not be as sus-
ceptible to simulation techniques.16
The Institute for Defense Analyses advocated that these manage-
ment science techniques be applied to the analysis of crime and the
overall criminal justice system in its report to the President's Commis-
sion on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice 7 ° The Report
stressed the need to compile data on projected outcomes of decisions
taken to change aspects of the criminal justice process. Controlled ex-
perimentation, applied to actual operations, would be the most direct
method for discerning the impact of proposed actions. However, this
It may be possible to construct many different models of one reference system: the model
chosen will depend on the goals of the simulation, and these goals may in turn be de-
termined by the biases of the simulator. See Stogdill, Introdaction: The Student and
Model Building, in THE PROCESS OF MODEL BUILDING IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
3, 6 (R. Stogdill ed. 1970).
165. See Comment, supra note 164, at 713-14.
166. Dutton & Briggs, Simulation Model Construction, in J. DUTTON & W. STAR-
BUCK, COMPUTER SIMULATION OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 103, 122 (1970).
167. Fleisher, The Uses of Simulation, in COMPUTER METHODS IN THE ANALYSIS
OF LARGE-SCALE SOCIAL SYSTEMS 145 (J. Beshers ed. 1964).
168. See Cowan, Decision Theory in Law, Science and Technology, 17 RUTGERS
L. REV. 499-510 (1963).
169. See generally Boyd, Law in Computers and Computers in Law: A Lawyer's
View of the State of the Art, 14 ARIz. L. REv. 267, 298-310 (1972).
170. TAsK FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 8, at 37.
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is often neither feasible nor appropriate. Because of their sensitivity,
normal operations may not be amenable to an interventionist strat-
egy.' 7 ' As a workable alternative, the Institute urged that a mathe-
matical model of the criminal justice system be formulated to explore
the relationships among the various parts. 1 2
The case flow model of criminal justice administrative processes
and resource allocation is the most accessible and most frequently cited
model. It is the class of efficiency models that has attracted much pub-
lic attention and a large share of research expenditures." 3 The model
represents a straight-forward application of management science tech-
niques. It is most easily understood in diagrammatic form, as repre-
sented in Figure One.174
JUSSIM175 is an example of such a processing model that is cur-
rently operational. 7 6 It represents the most highly developed and most
171. For discussions of the use of experimentation in legal processes, see Campbell,
Legal Reforms as Experiments, 23 J. LEGAL ED. 217 (1970); Zeisel, Reflections on Ex-
perimental Techniques in the Law, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 107 (1973); Zimring, Measuring
the Impact of Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal Justice System, 41 U. CHI. L. REV.
224, 235-41 (1974).
172. TASK FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 8, at 54. One
of the earliest such models was of the District of Columbia Court system. See Navarro &
Taylor, Data Analyses and Simulation of Court System in the District of Columbia for
the Processing of Felony Defendants, in TASK FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECH-
NOLOGY at 199. See also Navarro & Taylor, An Application of Systems Analysis to Aid
in the Efficient Administration of Justice, 51 JUDICATURE 47 (1967). More recent exam-
ples of systems analysis applied to court systems include: SYSTEMS STUDY IN COURT DE,
LAY (Notre Dame University, Law School and College of Engineering, 1972, in 4 vols.)
(prepared for LEAA); R. HANN, DECISION MAKING IN THE CANADIAN CRIMINAL COURT
SYSTEM: A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS (1973) (this study is critiqued at West, Book Review,
32 U. TORONTO FACULTY OF L. REV. 191 (1974); A SYSTEM STUDY OF PORTLAND,
OREGON, FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT (1972) (conducted by the Court Studies Division
of the National College of the State Judiciary); ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, INC., COST/SAVING ANALYSIS OF ADMINISTRATIVE IMPROVE-
MENTS IN THE NEw YORK CITY CRIMINAL COURT (1973).
173. Gardiner, Research Models in Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 6
LAw & SoC'Y REv. 223-24 (1971).
174. CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY at 590-91.
175. See Blumstein & Larson, Models of a Total Criminal Justice System, 17
OPERATIONS RESEARCH 199 (1969) (reprinted in SYSTEMS APPROACH AND THE CITY
207 (M. Mesarovic ed. 1972)). The case flow model is not the only type of model that
has been developed. Professor Blumstein has also designed a model that enables the de-
cision-maker to plot the "crime career" of a defendant who first enters the system.
Based on the imputs of the defendant's age and type of crime, this model generates a
criminal career profile that indicates the kinds of crimes for which the defendant is likely
to be re-arrested in the future. Id. at 217.
Another highly technical model, applied to the flow of criminal cases in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia, was developed by Professor John H. Reed
in his study THE APPLICATION OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH TO COURT DELAY (1973).
176. The JUSSIM model is currently being used, in one form or another, in the
following locations: Allegheny County (Pittsburgh), Pennsylvania, Alaska (corrections





widely implemented use of operations research in the criminal justice
field.
Like the diagram, JUSSIM's structure is relatively easy to under-
stand. JUSSIM is designed to be an "interactive computer program"' 7
that represent a flow of "units" (translated "crimes," "arrestees," "peo-
ple") through the criminal justice agencies. The model indicates the
amount of resources used by these "units" on the basis of administra-
tive cost incurred per unit of workload at each processing stage.17
JUSSIM operates on the assumption that there is a "downstream
flow" of cases from reported crimes to corrections. As these cases are
"handled" they are either passed on to the next stage or diverted from
the process: "the flow through any stage is a subset of the flow at a
previous stage." 179 By simulation, JUSSIM alters the flow by enabling
D.C. Louisiana has adapted JUSSIM for use in its Family Planning Program. Lecture by
Professor Alfred Blumstein, S.U.N.Y. at Buffalo, April 9, 1975. Perhaps the most ambitious
description of a planning agency's use of JUSSIM and of its efforts to develop a data
base for a quantitative description of a county criminal justice system can be found in a
recent report prepared by the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, A
Criminal Justice Planning Model for Prince George's County, Maryland, June 1975
(available from the Maryland Governor's Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice, Cockeysville, Maryland).
177. JUSSIM's designers have stressed the importance of the interactive nature of
the model which makes it easily accessible to those not technically trained. This feature
allows a criminal justice planner to sit at a computer terminal in his office and change
the system represented in the model, rapidly observe the implications of the changes and
then immediately make subsequent changes based on this newly acquired data. The model
makes all the technical mathematical translation and computations for the planner.
Belkin, Blumstein, Glass & Lettre, Jussim, An Interactive Computer Program and its
Uses in Criminal Justice Planning, School of Urban and Public Affairs, Carnegie-Mellon
Universtiy, Reprint No. 89, 467, 468 (1972). For a critique of systems designers who
try to provide managers with very easy access to their system and assure them they
need to know nothing about it, see Ackoff, Management Misinformation Systems, 14
MANAGEMENT Sci. B-147, B-151-52 (1967).
178. For example, formulas programmed into JUSSIM enable the model to cal-
culate:
(1) the number of days of judge time required for dealing with a particular
type of crime;
(2) the number of judges required for this type of crime, and
(3) the cost of judgeships in the particular court system under study.
JUSSIM can then multiply the number of defendants in a certain crime category (de-
termined on a yearly basis) by the percentage that eventually are channeled off to trial.
Based on experience that shows that judges normally devote a certain amount of time
to cases in this particular crime category, the number of judge-days required to adjudi-
cate these cases can then be calculated and, by summation, total annual costs for a
particular crime type (in terms of judicial costs) can then be calculated. Prosecution,
police, corrections and other supportive costs can be programmed into the model as
well. Blumstein & Larson, supra note 175, at 202-07.
179. Blumstein, Systems Analysis of Crime Control and the Criminal Justice Sys-
tern, supra note 154, at 254. "Branching ratios" represent percentages of the total case
flow that are diverted from the system at various stages: of those defendants accused
of a certain crime, some will be released prior to booking; of those remaining some
will be released prior to trial, some will plead guilty, and so on.
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the user to make changes at certain points in the process. The model
indicates the concomitant changes generated at other points in the
system downstream from where the change is made and the resources
required to accommodate these changes.
An extension of JUSSIM attempts to calculate the future conse-
quences of programs that might affect either the probability or rearrest
or the amount of time between release and rearrest. JUSSIM II was de-
veloped to incorporate the necessary feedback flow paths into the






(1) associates an average time until rearrest with each of.the feed-
back flow paths ("time delay");
(2) by applying probability theory, it specifies the new offense
for which a recidivist is likely to be arrested ("crime switch"
matrix);
(3) it accommodates the input of first-time or "virgin" arrests as
well.
180. Diagram is found at Blumstein & Stafford, Application of the JUSSIM Model
to a Juvenile Justice System, Computer Applications in the Juvenile Justice System,
Proceedings, National Council of Juvenile Court Judges, 60, 74 (December 1973). Sze
also Belkin, Blumstein & Glass, JUSSIM II, An Interactive Feedback Model for Crim-
inal Justice Planning, Urban Systems Institute Report (School of Urban and Public Af-
fairs, Carnegie-Mellon University, June 1973); Belkin, Blumstein & Glass, Recidivism
as a Feedback Process: Analytical Model and Empirical Validation, 1 J. Cram. JUSTICE
7 (1973); Blumstein, Management Science to Aid the Manager: An Example from the
Criminal Justice System, 15 SLOAN MANAGEMENT REv. 35, 44-47 (1973).
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Long-run impacts of programs aimed at reducing recidivism are of
fundamental concern for future planning.' 8' The addition of feedback
capability to the basic linear JUSSIM model was intended to enable
criminal justice planners to assess the impact of proposed policies on
future patterns of recidivism.
It should be remembered that the results of the simulation do not
prove that system dysfunctions identified in the model (or other changes
generated in the course of modelling) reflect the actual workings of
the criminal justice processes. The simulator can only suggest that cer-
tain areas should be more closely examined as possible sources of delay,
etc. Nor does the simulation mandate remedies if a problem is identi-
fied. The simulation can only increase the amount of information
available to the decision-maker responsible for dealing with systemic
problems. 82
VI. CRITIQUE OF JUSSIM
A critique of JUSSIM's contributions to decision-making should
address two premises underlying this formal model. First, as with
PROMIS and computerized judicial administration, JUSSIM is pri-
marily concerned with gauging the performance of the criminal justice
system in terms of optimal resource allocation. Second, the model en-
dreavors to adhere to standards of scientific objectivity in its quantita-
tive descriptions of relationships within the criminal justice system.
This section will consider whether efficiency and a formal model's "ob-
jectivity" should be the dominant criteria structuring the choices avail-
able to criminal justice planners and policy-makers.
As in related systems approaches to dealing with social phenom-
ena, 83 JUSSIM operates on the assumption that social rationality can
181. This problem of future planning is addressed in Sigurdson, Carter & Mc-
Eachern, Methodological Impediments to Comprehensive Criminal justice Planning, 9
CRIMINOLOGY 248 (1971). The Social Science Research Institute at the University of
Southern California has been involved in efforts closely parallel to Professor Blum-
stein's which are designated as the "systems rate approach." See also Carter, Dightman
& Klein, The System Rate Approach to Description and Evaluation of Criminal Justice
Systems, 11 CRIMINOLOGY 462 (1974); Klein, Kobrin, McEachern & Sigurdson, System
Rates: An Approach to Comprehensive Criminal justice Planning, 17 CRIME AND DF-
LIN. 355 (1971).
182. But see Professor Laurence Tribe's discussion of the phenomenon that quanti-
tative decision-making techniques are likely to bias conclusions toward considerations they
are most capable of incorporating. Tribe, Trial By Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in
the Legal Process, 84 Hv. L. Rxv. 1329, 1361-65 (1971).
The controversy of whether computer models should serve in an objective or ad-
versarial capacity is treated at McCarty, Book Review, 7 STAN. 3. INT'L STUDIES 154,
160 n.35 & accompanying text (1973).




be reduced "to the managerial goal of efficient resource deployment." 1 4
While it may be both a rational and socially desirable goal to use com-
puters to allocate resources, the allocation criteria may not be free
from prejudice and may be detrimental to society in the long run.
Given a narrow view of social rationality, the "correct" decision or re-
sponse becomes essentially a question of efficient administration. The
criminal justice system is seen as merely a processing machine that is
generating outcomes. 8 5 As Professor Lawrence Tribe has recognized,
"[s]uch 'end-result' theories have great appeal, for the notion of maxi-
mizing some desired end may seem the very essence of rationality."' 8
But in the course of focusing on ends, the significance of procedure as
such becomes denigrated. The problem becomes that of "reducing en-
tire problems to terms that misstate their underlying structure, typ-
ically collapsing into the task of maximizing some simple quantity, an
184. Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFFAIRS
66, 69 n.5 (1972).
185. This aspect of JUSSIM, as well as its other features, has been more exten-
sively critiqued at Reich, Operations Research and Criminal Justice, 22 J. PUB. L. 357
(1973). Mr. Reich's critique focuses on two basic aspects of JUSSIM. First, he objects to
JUSSIM's incorporation of past patterns into its mathematical formulas that are to
serve as a guide to the future:
[A] system that turns to OR is probably already deeply in trouble, and its
branching ratios and work loads are likely to be a source of a great deal of
discontent. Rather than the past supplying a norm of what it means to "handle"
the case flow, the past is probably a better guide for what it means not to
handle the case flow.
Id. at 375. Second, Mr. Reich finds that JUSSIM fails to model reality accurately.
In fact, Mr. Reich claims that JUSSIM offers such a distorted view of reality as to be
of little value to the actors in the criminal justice system. For example, since the model
assumes a single direction of causation, a "downstream flow," it cannot make such pre-
dictions as the impact that an increased number of jury trials might have on the pro-
pensity of prosecutors to engage in plea-bargaining. In addition, the model draws arti-
ficial boundaries around the criminal justice system, limiting its focus to the adminis-
trative costs incurred by the most formal institutions in the criminal justice area. Id.
at 378-80. According to Mr. Reich, JUSSIM can thus be of little practical value since
it fails to reflect the dynamism and inherent instability of the real world system. Id. at
375-78.
Professor Blumstein has acknowledged some of these limitations. He has observed
that at present it is technically unfeasible to build in such capabilities as predicting the
upstream effect of downstream changes. He has suggested that the model's limitations
be recognized and that JUSSIM be applied simply to pinpoint possible problem areas.
These areas can then be more carefully scrutinzed to determine if in fact they are the
source of systemic dysfunction. Interview with Professor Alfred Blumstein, S.U.N.Y. at
Buffalo, April 9, 1975.
Perhaps the real danger is not that JUSSIM over-simplifies reality, but rather that
the model does in fact, if not in conception, mirror reality: that our criminal justice
institutions have become mere processing machines into which defendants are fed and
from which dispositions are generated. See notes 1-9 supra. See generally D. HOLT,
THE JUSTICE MACHINE (1972); MASS PRODUCTION JUSTICE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
IDEAL (C. Whitebread ed. 1970).
186. Tribe, Policy Science, supra note 184, at 79.
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enterprise whose ordering principle is not one of maximization at all," 187
This form of reduction is particularly attractive to the program planner
since it is likely to streamline the simulation model, to give greater ele-
gance to its formal structure.
While management information systems such as PROMIS enable
an administrator to regulate individual or even a series of operations
of a process, the use of a formal model such as JUSSIM allows an ad-
ministrator and his/her planning staff to extend their control, theo-
retically, over the entire process. At least modelling may create the im-
pression that a decision-maker can exercise control over an entire
process from a single vantage point. Constructing a formal model of
an entire process or system thus becomes a logical extension for plan-
ners who wish to rationally manipulate all the elements of an environ-
ment.188
A thorough treatment of the social and philosophical implications
of the use of formal, scientific models to structure decision-making is
not within the scope of this comment.189 However, these concerns must
be addressed at least briefly since formal modelling represents one of
the most important aspects of the systems approach.
Formal computer models such as JUSSIM attempt to put social
and administrative activities on a scientific basis. The model's claims
to "objectivity" are derived from its rigorous descriptions of the crim-
inal justice system. However, there is a tendency to proceed from these
descriptions to an evaluation of the JUSSIM-generated data which
bases its *claims to objectivity on the precision of the descriptions. This
approach is appealing, since it establishes a definite evaluative method
based on whatever relationships are found among gathered data. The
187. Id. at 97 (emphasis in original).
188. See, e.g., BRIEFING SERIES No. 10, supra note 84, at 6, where the benefits of
modeling are extolled:
[R]esearchers will be able to construct a "model" of the prosecutorial process;
that is, through studying PROMIS data, they will express in mathematical
and logical terms the operations and various "cause-and-effect" relationships
within the prosecutor's office. With such a mathematical model, research
personnel simulate real-life conditions and, through computer analysis, in-
vestigate the effect of certain policy changes on overall office effectiveness.
189. Essential elements of this problem have been treated thoroughly by Professor
Laurence Tribe in his stimulating critique of the tendency of economic and policy sci-
ence models and analyses to emphasize end results to the exclusion of process. In a pro-
gression of articles, Professor Tribe reflects on the implications of concepts of "instru-
mental (means-end) rationality" for decision-makling in a technological context. See
Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HtAv. L.
REv. 1329 (1971); Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHILOSOPHY & PUn.
AFFAIRS 66 (1972); Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The
Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 617 (1974). See generally L.
TRIBE, CHANNELING TECHNOLOGY THROUGH LAW (1972).
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model can assign numerical or other rating values to categories in the
criminal justice process which would lack this stability in a real-life
situation. By fixing the criminal justice process momentarily in a
steady-state simulation model, the management scientist provides each
component with a statistical value and ensures its theoretical manipu-
latability.
Yet there is an important gap between the descriptive model and
the way that the decision-makers (prosecutors, judges and planners)
evaluate and interpret the model's data. One must always ask whether
a formal model provides the basis for its own data interpretation or
whether the conclusions are being superimposed on the model. That is,
one should seek to determine whether the formal model is predisposed
through its categories to structure the situation presented to it for the
sake of a previously determined desirable outcome. For JUSSIM the
desirable outcome is defined as efficient resource allocation, which is
seen as the equivalent of improving the quality of justice. But in its
operation JUSSIM has suppressed, or at the least designated as "con-
straints on the model," less easily defined considerations such as due
process and the nature of the substantive law, which are of even
greater importance to an appreciation of the quality of justice. Thus,
even if the interpretations of the data are all closely related to the
model's descriptions, it is still likely that the choices the model sug-
gests are influenced by widely accepted (and consequently, inobtrusive)
social, economic or political judgments (such as efficiency as a positive
value) that have been incorporated into the model's mathematical
formulas.
The model does not exist in a judgmental vacuum, untainted by
the attitudes which exist outside it. A truly useful model must do more
than provide labels for a circular system of categories within it. Origi-
nators and implementors of a useful model must also anticipate the
way in which its data will be read and construct a model that will ac-
knowledge responsibility for those interpretations. If the categories
are to mean anything to us, they must be related to something other
than statistical patterns. In the end, they must be returned to the in-
tangible processes of human decision-making which guide the admin-
istration of our criminal justice institutions. It is true that the intui-
tive processes of human decision-making are difficult to define in mathe-
matical terms. Still, this does not relieve the management scientist of
the responsibility of attempting to deal with these intuitive processes
in the formal model. If a mathematical model is unable to incorporate
these considerations, then the model must acknowledge its limitations,
19761 :,
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and, if possible, that acknowledgement should be built into the model.
It is particularly important that JUSSIM acknowledge its limita-
tions since it has been undertaken with the expectation of changing
the criminal justice system.15 0 To date, it has been applied in a very
limited context, primarily by criminal justice planners in some of the
LEAA funded State Planning Agencies. 191 Its relevance is currently
limited to a mathematical exploration of categories within the criminal
justice system. In order to be formulated at all, it has had to suppress
the activating force behind the entire system-the human decision-
making of police, prosecutors, judges and penal officers.
Moreover, when users approach JUSSIM as a scientific-objective
tool they fail to relate the model directly to its real goal, to the changing
of the criminal justice system. A model that is implemented for the
purpose of suggesting change can no longer be classified as neutral or
objective. Since JUSSIM is essentially an efficiency model, the range
of available options that it presents to a decision-maker must necessarily
be limited to the categories that it can generate. Such contributions can
hardly be termed "objective" or neutral. JUSSIM's users should recog-
nize the tension that exists between the claim that JUSSIM is scientific-
190. Recent literature has been more candid about some of the limitations of
JUSSIM and the systems approach:
The danger with this approach is that analysts, as well as users of these anal-
yses, may refuse to acknowledge, or overlook, the assumptions and caveats and
examine only the conclusions of such an approach. The result will probably be
either blind acceptance of the conclusions or total rejection, for reasons irrele-
vant to the original assumptions.
BLUMSTEIN, CAssmY & HOPCINSON, SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND THE CANADIAN CRIIINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 2 (CANJUS Project Report No. 14, 1974) (CANJUS is the acronym
for a project undertaken by the Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada in which
a variation of JUSSIM is being used to develop a comprehensive model of the Ca-
nadian criminal justice system). See generally CASSIDY, A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO PLAN-
NING AND EVALUATION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEIS (CANJUS Project Report No.
18, 1974); CASSIDY, SIMULATION OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS: PRODUCT OR PROCESS (Statistics
Division Report No. 12, 1974), Ministry of the Solicitor General, Gov't of Canada.
At the same time that management scientists are acknowledging the limits of this
approach, there is a danger that lawyers may leap into the field with enthusiasm that is
not tempered by the lawyer's normally critical eye. The contributions to policy-making
that a lawyer can make, in contrast to those of the engineer or management scientist,
have been discussed at Ackerman & Sawyer, The Uncertain Search for Environmental
Policy: Scientific Factfinding and Rational Decisionmaking Along the Delaware River,
120 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 496-97 (1972). In particular, the lawyer is well-trained to
assess the policy implications of the expert information generated by the management
scientist's model. The lawyer is in a position to expose the uncertainties impinging on
the accuracy of the model's predictions, an obligation which the management scientist,
who has a vested interest in the model's prediction capabilities, may ignore or avoid in
emphasizing the model's successes.
191. Lecture by Professor Alfred Blumstein, State University of New York at
Buffalo, April 9, 1975.
(Vol. 25
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION
objective in nature, thus implying some sort of value-free status, and
the adoption of this efficiency model as an instrument of change. It
simply cannot be maintained with consistency that JUSSIM's "scienti-
fically-generated" data are "objective" inputs to policy formulation and,
at the same time, be claimed that subsequent decisions to implement
changes are wholly external to the model.
A formal model is designed to eliminate evaluations based on im-
pressions, hasty judgments and biased thinking. But in order to keep
its formalism secure from subjectivism, it must also maintain a distance
from both its origin (human decision) and its end (changing the sys-
tem). We seriously misjudge the role of the formal model when we
choose to ignore what it has necessarily suppressed. We ought to be
wary of claims that meaning can arise independently of a mind that
imposes it and of claims that meaning is located in a nexus of relation-
ships which can be abstracted outside of a human context. We cannot
expect that algorithms and flow charts can or should release us from
the responsibility of social and legal interpretation.
CONCLUSION
The press, popular magazines and television have shown how the
average citizen, whether s/he lives in a metropolitan area or not, is
terrified by grisly reports of street crimes.192 Crime is more than a
national crisis; it is quickly becoming a psychological obsession for
many people.193 The very urgency of this fear predisposes legislators,
administrators and government leaders to seek out comprehensive
solutions. Since anti-crime programs sponsored by state and federal
governments have generally failed to produce the results expected of
them, it is likely that more governmental leaders will turn to science
as a more promising originator of new programs. Management and
computer science may be able to offer the analytic and predictive capa-
bilities needed to probe the weaknesses in current programs. However,
as Aldous Huxley has noted, scientific theories are at best a representa-
tion of reality, "for the simple reason that science does not even profess
to deal with experience as a whole, but only with certain aspects of it
in certain contexts."'194 However much we might wish for a causal ex-
planation of crime or recidivism, or a definitive rating system which
192. See, e.g., The Crime Wave, TIME, June 30, 1975, at 10-24.
193. Id. at 12-13.
194. A. HUXLEY, SCIENCE, LIBERTY AND PEACE 28 (1950). See generally R. BoGus-
LAW, THE NEW UTOPIANS (1965); J. ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (1964).
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could point out the individuals most likely to harm the community, we
must recall that human behavior has always exceeded any conceptual
or empirical framework devised to contain it.
The courts' principal role has always been to administer justice,
to oversee individual adjudications of guilt or innocence, not to deter
crime. The philosophic focus of our principles of criminal justice ad-
ministration has been on the individual defendant rather than on court
machinery or limited state budgets. The constitutional core of these
principles is that a person may not be punished, or otherwise deprived
of his/her liberty by the Government until it has been proved by an
impartial and deliberate process that s/he has violated a specific law. 05
As an eminent jurist, from a time less obsessed with speed and effi-
ciency as panaceas for social ills, has warned: 106
We secure greater speed, economy and convenience in the admin-
istration of the law at the price of fundamental principles of consti-
tutional liberty. That price is too high.
JoHN HARTJE
195. CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SoCIETY, supra note 1, at 70.
196. People v. Fisher, 249 N.Y. 419, 432, 164 N.E. 336, 341 (1928) (Lehman, J.,
dissenting).
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